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The  cruel  choice  between  two evils,  unemployment  and  inflation, 
has become  the major  economic  issue  of the day.' 
THE INTERVAL  FROM 1969:3 TO 1970:4 qualifies  as a full-fledged  eco- 
nomic  slowdown  in which  the official  unemployment  rate increased  by 59 
percent.  But in the first  year  of every  previous  U.S. postwar  recession,  the 
rate  of inflation  was  lower  than  it was in the last expansion  year,  while  the 
rate  of inflation  was  more  rapid  in 1970  than  during  any  part  of the  previous 
business  expansion.2  This  paper  develops  wage  and  price  equations  that at- 
tempt,  first,  to explain  why  inflation  accelerated  in 1970  rather  than  slowing 
as it did during  past  recessions;  second,  to isolate  the relative  role of prices 
and wages  in the 1970  episode;  and  third,  to form  predictions  of wage  and 
price  behavior  during  the next ten years.  In particular,  the paper  attempts 
to predict  the response  of the rate of inflation  to alternative  paths of eco- 
nomic  recovery--that  is, to estimate  how much  more rapidly  prices  would 
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1. James  Tobin and Leonard  Ross, "Living  with Inflation,"  The  New York  Review  of 
Books, Vol. 16 (May 6, 1971), p. 23. 
2. During the five expansionary  quarters  between 1968:2 and 1969:3, the nonfarm 
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figures during previous recessions, see my "Prices in 1970: The Horizontal Phillips 
Curve?"  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity  (3:1970), p. 449. 
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increase  if full employment  were to be attained  swiftly  rather  than grad- 
ually.  In addition,  the short-  and long-run  tradeoffs  between  inflation  and 
unemployment  are  calculated.  The  results  show  that  in the long run  a given 
reduction  in the unemployment  rate  causes  a greater  increase  in the rate  of 
inflation  than  most previous  research  has suggested;  nevertheless,  the data 
do not support  the "accelerationist"  hypothesis  that there  is no long-run 
tradeoff. 
Inflationary  1970:  Was It a Surprise? 
The Phillips  curve  pictures  a widely  accepted  hypothesis  that the rate of 
inflation  is inversely  dependent  on the rate  of unemployment.  The simplest 
version  of the hypothesis  makes  no distinction  between  long-run  and  short- 
run  Phillips  curves;  the economy  is always  on "the"  curve  and experiences 
an immediate  reduction  in the rate  of inflation  whenever,  as in 1970,  the un- 
employment  rate rises.  A more sophisticated  approach  treats  the Phillips 
curve  as a long-run  equilibrium  relationship  from  which  the economy  can 
diverge  in the short  run.  In particular,  if wages  and prices  adjust  slowly  to 
changes  in economic  conditions,  an increase  in the unemployment  rate is 
not accompanied  by an immediate  reduction  in the rate  of inflation.  Even- 
tually, however,  the rate of inflation  will decline  after sufficient  time has 
passed  for the lagged  effects  of the higher  unemployment  rate  to work  their 
way through  the economy. 
In an  earlier  paper,  I presented  one  version  of a "dynamic  Phillips  curve" 
in which  inflation  was determined  by the interaction  of separate  wage  and 
price  equations.3  How surprising  was 1970  when  viewed  against  their  pre- 
dictions?  Using actual  price  changes  to help  predict  wages,  the wage equa- 
tion tracked  the first  half of 1970  well,  but underpredicted  the rate of wage 
increase  in the last two quarters  by an average  of 1.0  percentage  point  at an 
annual  rate.  Using actual  wage  changes  in the price  equation,  it underpre- 
dicted the annual  rate of price increase  by an average  of 1.1 percentage 
points  during  the last three  quarters  of the year.  Full predictions,  based  on 
predicted  rather  than actual  values  of both variables  in both equations,  re- 
sult in a widening  underprediction  of the rate of price  increase,  reaching  2 
percentage  points  in the fourth  quarter. 
3. Robert J. Gordon, "The Recent Acceleration  of Inflation  and Its Lessons for the 
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In short, the continued  acceleration  of inflation  in 1970 was indeed a 
"surprise"  when  compared  with these  predictions.  This paper  seeks  to de- 
velop refinements  to these earlier  wage and price equations  that will im- 
prove  both the fit to historical  data  and  the explanation  of developments  in 
1970. 
Like most other recent  research,  the model developed  here postulates 
that  the primary  force  "driving"  the rate  of inflation  is the determination  of 
wages  in the labor  market.  The price  equation  is based on the hypothesis 
that in the long run the relative  shares  of wage and nonwage  income  are 
constant  and  that  the price  level  is thus  "tied"  to labor  cost; the purpose  of 
the price  equation  is then  to describe  temporary  deviations  of the distribu- 
tion of income  from  this  long-run  constant  relationship.  The dominant  role 
this model  assigns  to wages  in the inflation  process  justifies  the dispropor- 
tionate  emphasis  that it receives  in the following  discussion. 
The Determination  of Wages 
The theory  of wage  determination  used  here  is similar  in its general  fea- 
tures to the approach  taken by most previous  econometric  research.  The 
primary  current force that pulls the wage level upward  (relative  to "stan- 
dard"  productivity)  is an excess  demand  for labor. When  workers  are in 
short  supply,  firms  raise  wage  rates  both to bid workers  away  from other 
firms  and  to induce  new  entrants  into the labor  force.  Workers  do not eval- 
uate wage offers  by employers  in a vacuum,  however,  but measure  them 
against  the wage  they expect  to receive  if they remain  in their  present  jobs 
and  the expected  price  level  of the goods  they  will  be able  to buy  with  them. 
Thus  the second  major  force  pushing  upward  on wage  rates  is the expected 
rate of increase  in prices  and wages.  Even without  current  excess  demand 
for labor,  the average  wage  rate  would  be pushed  up faster  than the trend 
increase  in productivity  if the price  level were  expected  to rise  rapidly.4  In 
4. For a theoretical  labor market  model in which the primary  "pushing"  force is the 
expected  increase  in wages,  see Edmund  S. Phelps,  "Money-Wage  Dynamics  and Labor- 
Market Equilibrium,"  Journal  of Political Economy,  Vol. 76 (July/August 1968), pp. 
678-711. For a model in which  the expected  increase  in prices  plays a dominant  role, see 
Milton Friedman,  "The  Role of Monetary  Policy,"  American  Economic  Review,  Vol. 58 
(March 1968), pp. 1-14. A hybrid model combining  elements of both approaches  and 
several  other  innovations  is contained  in a monograph  that I am currently  preparing  for 
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short,  the basic  variables  in most wage  equations  fall into two classes,  in- 
tended  to measure  either  (1) the "pull" of the labor market,  or (2) the 
"push"  of price  expectations.  Much of the controversy  in the field  centers 
on the way to measure  excess  labor demand  and price expectations;  the 
selection  among  the competing  methods  that  make  theoretical  and  intuitive 
sense  depends  on the verdict  of the empirical  data. 
ALTERNATIVE  MEASURES OF EXCESS LABOR DEMAND 
The aggregate  unemployment  rate,  the most widely  publicized  measure 
of labor market  tightness,  is subject  to several  important  criticisms  that 
have  led George  Perry,  myself,  and others  to suggest  alternative  measures. 
The unemployment  inverse  (1/U). Frictional  and structural  unemploy- 
ment  set a floor  to the unemployment  rate,  but  there  is no upper  limit  to the 
degree  of excess  demand  that  can  accompany  this  minimum  unemployment 
rate.  Thus  the relationship  of excess  demand  and hence  wage  increases  to 
the  unemployment  rate  is usually  assumed  to be convex  to the origin.  In an 
attempt  to approximate  this convexity,  the inverse  of the unemployment 
rate  has  been  the measure  of labor  market  pressure  most frequently  used  in 
previous  research. 
The vacancy  rate (V).  Since  the major  current  determinant  of wage in- 
creases  is assumed  to be net excess  labor demand,  the rate of unemploy- 
ment,  which  measures  excess  labor supply,  should  in principle  be supple- 
mented  by a measure  of excess  labor  demand.  Unfortunately,  the absence 
of a comprehensive  vacancy  measure  for the postwar  United  States  has in- 
hibited  this approach,  but I propose  to use, as a rough  approximation  to a 
vacancy  rate, the number  of "nonagricultural  job openings  unfilled"  (a 
series  collected  by the U.S. Manpower  Administration)  divided  by the ci- 
vilian  labor force.  The obstacle  to using  this series  is its partial  coverage, 
but  a workable  assumption  is that  the  ratio  of "unmeasured"  to "measured" 
vacancies  is constant.  If so, the vacancy  rate  (V) can  be multiplied  by a con- 
stant selected  to make the net excess  demand  measure  (V  -  U) equal to 
zero in a period  when labor markets  appear  to be "in balance."5 
5. I assumed that labor markets were "in balance" in 1965:2, requiring  that the 
vacancy  rate be multiplied  by 11.0.  This arbitrary  choice serves  only to scale the vacancy 
rate to the same order  of magnitude  as the unemployment  rate, but has no effect on the 
final  results,  since V, and U, are entered  separately  into the regressions  below in order  to 
allow the com'puter  to determine the "true" contribution of each variable to labor 
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The total unemployment  rate of manhours  (UL).  In my first article for 
the Brookings  panel,  I employed  a measure  of unemployment  that adjusts 
the official  index  for both the rate of "disguised  unemployment"  and "the 
unemployment  of hours."  Disguised  unemployment  (UD) estimates the 
number  of individuals  not in the labor force, and therefore  not officially 
counted  as unemployed,  who would  accept  jobs if they  were  available.  Un- 
employment  of hours  (UH)  measures  deviations  of actual  hours  worked  per 
week from an estimate  of the hours  that would  be worked  at full employ- 
ment.  Deviations  between  the official  (U) and "total"  unemployment  rates 
(UL =  U +  UD +  UH) were particularly marked in 1969, when labor de- 
mand  was  so intense  that  employers  filled  jobs substantially  by drawing  new 
entrants  into the labor force;  the official  unemployment  rate declined  be- 
tween  1968  and 1969  only  from  3.63  to 3.53  percent,  while  the total rate  de- 
clined  from  3.73 to 2.93 percent.6 
The weighted  unemployment  rate (U*).  Perry has suggested that the "effi. 
ciency units" of effective  labor supply contributed  by unemployed  indi- 
viduals  of various  age-sex  groups  depend  both on the average  hours per 
week  typically  worked  and  the average  wage  typically  received  by members 
of each group.  A prime-age  male capable  of filling  a job paying  $4.00  per 
hour  for a forty-hour  week  makes  a greater  contribution  to effective  labor 
supply  than a teenager  who typically  fills a $1.50-per-hour  job for fifteen 
hours  per  week,  but both are  counted  as one body  in the official  unemploy- 
ment statistics.  To remedy  this problem  Perry  has calculated  a "weighted 
unemployment  rate"  and has provided  his data for use here.7 
Unemployment  dispersion (DU).  Since the relationship between excess 
demand  and unemployment  is usually  assumed  to be convex  to the origin, 
the degree  of excess  demand  associated  with  a given  average  unemployment 
rate is higher  if unemployment  rates  for subgroups  of the labor force are 
widely  dispersed  (indicating  that  workers  in the different  subgroups  are  not 
perfect  substitutes)  than if they are all equal  to the average  rate.  Perry  has 
constructed  a dispersion  measure  along  the age-sex  dimension  of the labor 
force, and his index  has been used here.8  Other  dispersion  measures  could 
6. The calculations  of the total unemployment  rate have been revised  in the past year 
and are described  in Appendix C. The total unemployment  series (UL), but not  the 
vacancy rate (V), reveals 1969 as a year of intense labor demand, suggesting  that the 
two measures  pick up evidence  of excess  labor demand  in different  occupations  or areas. 
7. George L. Perry,  "Changing  Labor Markets  and Inflation,"  Brookings  Papers  on 
Economic  Activity  (3:1970), pp. 411-41. 
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also  be developed  along  geographical  or industrial  dimensions,  but  this  task 
has not been undertaken  here. Both of the Perry  measures,  U* and DU, 
basically  test the hypothesis  that a given official  unemployment  rate was 
associated  with a higher  level of net labor  demand  in the late 1960s  than  in 
the mid-1950s  because  the unemployment  rate  of young  workers  and adult 
women  was much  higher  relative  to the unemployment  rate of prime-age 
males  in the recent  period  than in the earlier  period.9 
For standard  statistical  methods  to be able  to discriminate  among  them, 
the alternative  measures  of labor  market  tightness  must  exhibit  significantly 
different  patterns  of behavior  over  postwar  business  cycles.  The major  dif- 
ferences  among  the series  are  as follows:  For much  of the period  the actual 
unemployment  inverse  (1/U) and weighted  unemployment  inverse  (I/U*) 
follow  virtually  the same  path,  but 1/U* indicates  considerably  more  labor 
market  pressure  than 1/U in 1964-69,  particularly  in 1968-69.  The  vacancy 
rate (V) follows  the cyclical  path of I/U* but indicates  somewhat  tighter 
markets  in the 1957-67  period,  especially  in 1966.  The  total unemployment 
inverse  (I/UL)  behaves  quite differently  and indicates  much  weaker  labor 
markets  than 1/U during  the entire  period 1957-66,  and a much stronger 
labor market  in 1969. Starting  in the mid-1950s,  the dispersion  measure 
(DU) rises  relative  to 1/U, indicating  tighter  labor markets  at any given 
unemployment  rate,  with the gap opening  especially  rapidly  in 1963-64. 
THE MEASUREMENT OF PRICE  EXPECTATIONS 
The determination  of price  expectations  has  become  an increasingly  pop- 
ular  subject  for research  in recent  years  as the accelerating  pace of U.S. in- 
flation  has made  the topic more relevant.  Virtually  none of the published 
papers  on wage  determination,  however,  devotes  more  than cursory  atten- 
tion to the problem.  The wage  equations  developed  here  allow  the data  to 
determine  the answers  to three  different  sets of issues. 
The  length  of  the lag. Most commonly,  price  effects  have  been  introduced 
by including  changes  in the consumer  price  index  as an explanatory  variable 
in the wage  equation  with  a one-quarter  lag. If its result  is interpreted  as an 
expectation  variable,  this  practice  implies  that  individuals  always  expect  the 
9. An approximation  to the Perry  hypothesis  could be tested directly  through  the use 
of the official  unemployment  rate for a "prime"  group-for  example,  married  males- 
as a measure'of labor market tightness. Experimental  tests of this measure in wage 
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rate  of change  of prices  to be what  it was  in the previous  quarter,  a curious 
kind  of myopia.  This  implication  conflicts  with  a growing  body of evidence 
that  price  expectations,  in so far  as they  are  revealed  in financial  markets  by 
the behavior  of interest  rates,  are  determined  by a considerably  longer  his- 
tory of past price  changes.  Here I test several  alternatives,  comparing  the 
one-quarter  lag with a longer pattern of lag coefficients  on past price 
changes  as determined  in equations  explaining  the market  interest  rate  (see 
Appendix  A).'0 The  final  price  expectations  variable,  although  based  on the 
interest  rate  equations,  has a pattern  of lag coefficients  very  similar  to that 
obtained  when a long series  of past inflation  terms  is included  directly  in 
the wage  equation. 
The  appropriate  price variable.  In previous  research,  the consumer  price 
index  (CPI)  generally  has been  chosen  as the appropriate  price  variable  for 
inclusion  in awage  equation,  on the reasonable  groundsthat  it is  widely  pub- 
licized  and  enters  into cost-of-living  clauses  in wage  bargains.  But  the use  of 
the CPI creates  a problem  for wage-price  models  designed  to predict  infla- 
tion. If the CPI helps  to predict  wages  and wages  help to predict  the non- 
farm  private  deflator  (NPD), the price  variable  that the model  attempts  to 
explain,  the circuit  must  be closed  with a third  equation  relating  the CPI  to 
the NPD, a link that appears  impossible  to estimate  properly  at present." 
A simple  and direct  expedient  is the use of the deflator  for personal  con- 
sumption  expenditures  (PCD) in the wage equation.  This is desirable  not 
only because  the PCD can be more  easily  related  to the NPD than  can the 
CPI, but also because  the CPI may contain  an upward  bias not present  in 
the PCD.12  The  choice  between  the CPI  and  the PCD is important,  because 
10. The one-quarter  lag has been used most recently  by Perry,  ibid.  For a discussion 
of the role of price expectations  in interest rate equations, see my "Econometrics  of 
Price Determination:  Discussion," in Otto Eckstein (ed.), The Econometrics  of Price 
Determination,  forthcoming  conference  volume. 
11. The CPI has caused  similar  difficulties  before.  See the discussion  of an attempt  to 
explain  the relation  between  the NPD and the CPI on pp. 37-38 of my article,  "Recent 
Acceleration  of Inflation." 
12. There  is a marked  discrepancy  between  the rates of increase  of the PCD and the 
CPI in the 1967-70 period which can be traced mainly to the differing  treatment  of 
housing. Here the PCD is preferable,  since the CPI (a) treats all price increases  in used 
houses as a pure  increase  in the cost of living to home purchasers  while totally ignoring 
the offsetting  benefit  of capital  gains to home sellers,  and (b) fails to adjust  rising mort- 
gageinterestrates  either  for the vast numbers  of homeowners  who hold existing  mortgages 
at fixed rates or for the contribution  to the interest  rate increase  of anticipated  capital 
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the estimated  coefficients  on the price expectations  variable  in the wage 
equation  tend to differ  in each case, as noted below. 
Effect of prices on the demand  for  labor. A  profit-maximizing firm at- 
tempts  to equate  the nominal  wage  and  the value  of labor's  marginal  prod- 
uct, which  increases  when  the firm  finds  it can sell its output  at a higher 
price.  In a period  of excess  commodity  demand,  when  (as is shown  below  in 
the discussion  of price  determination)  firms  raise  the price  level  relative  to 
labor cost, their  demand  for labor  increases  and they are willing  to pay a 
higher  wage.  The same  result  occurs,  even  if firms  do not take  the initiative 
in raising  wages,  when  union  leaders  respond  to a firm's  increased  profits  by 
demanding  higher  wage  increases  than they would otherwise.  In the wage 
equations  presented  below,  this "marginal-revenue-product  demand  effect" 
is tested  by including  as an additional  explanatory  variable  the difference 
between  the rate of increase  in product  prices, measured  by the NPD, 
and consumer  prices,  measured  by the PCD. If the coefficient  on this vari- 
able is positive,  the effect of prices  on wages works  through  this second 
channel  as well  as through  the price  expectations  mechanism;  an  increase  in 
total product  price relative  to consumer  prices could raise wages only 
through  the product  demand  effect,  since  there  would  be no direct  impact 
on the price  expectations  of consumers. 
OTHER DETERMINANTS  OF WAGE  CHANGE 
In addition  to the major  role  played  by labor  markets  and  price  expecta- 
tions in this analysis  of wage determination,  other factors  are tested for 
their  effects. 
Guideposts.  Following the recent tradition  in the wage determination 
literature,  I shall  test the significance  of a dummy  variable  in the final  wage 
equation to  represent  the effect of  the Kennedy-Johnson  wage-price 
guideposts.13 
Direct  taxes. The incidence  of taxes  on labor  income  depends  on the ef- 
fect  of the tax on labor's  pretax  share.  Workers  suffer  the full  burden  of the 
tax unless  their  pretax  income  share  increases  in response  to a rise  in the tax 
rate. But, since  the real pretax  wage  that employers  can afford  to pay de- 
13. The definition  of the guidepost  dummy  in Appendix  C is based on a suggestion 
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pends  on labor's  marginal  product,  workers  are likely  to bear  the full tax 
burden  in the long run, except  in special  circumstances.14  In the present 
wage-price  model, the pretax  distribution  of income  is determined  by the 
price  equation;  there  it turns  out that  the  burden  of both social  security  and 
personal  income  taxes  is borne  ultimately  by workers.'5 
But  regardless  of the long-run  effects  of direct  taxes,  a change  in tax rates 
may  have  a substantial  short-run  impact  on the rate  of inflation.  If the sup- 
ply of labor  offered  is greater  at higher  anticipated  real  wages-reckoned  as 
the after-tax  wage rate divided  by the price  level that workers  anticipate 
during  the contract  period-an  increase  in the rate of direct  taxation  on 
labor income  raises  the before-tax  wage that will be necessary  to induce 
workers  to supply  a given quantity  of labor.  The consequence  of the up- 
ward  shift  in the supply  schedule  caused  by the increase  in the tax rate  will 
be an increase  in the real  wage  before  taxes,  a consequent  reduction  in the 
quantity  of labor  that  firms  can afford  to hire,  and  an increase  in the unem- 
ployment  rate.  If policy  makers  offset  the increase  in unemployment  by ex- 
pansive  monetary  or fiscal  policy and return  the unemployment  rate  to its 
original  level,  the price  level  will  increase  by enough  to return  the before-tax 
real  wage  to its original  level,  and  the ultimate  effect  of the tax increase  will 
be an increase  in both nominal  wages  and  prices  with  no change  in the dis- 
tribution  of income.16 
Of course,  an increase  in the direct  tax rate  need not be inflationary.  If 
the supply  of labor  is inelastic  with  respect  to changes  in the real  wage,  an 
14. Regardless  of the elasticity of labor supply to changes in the real wage, labor's 
share is constant if the elasticity of substitution  between  labor and capital in the pro- 
duction function is unity. A tax increase  raises the before-tax  real wage, which (with 
competitive  factor  pricing)  reduces  employment  until the marginal  product  of labor has 
risen to the higher  real wage. When the elasticity  of substitution  is unity, the reduction 
in labor input  exactly  balances  the higher  real wage and leaves  labor's  share  unchanged; 
on the same assumptions,  labor's share increases  when the elasticity  of substitution  is 
less than unity. For evidence  supporting  a unitary  elasticity,  see the discussion  of price 
determination  below. 
15. For evidence from international  cross-section  data that labor bears the entire 
burden  of the social security  tax, that is, both the portion  paid by workers  and the por- 
tion paid by employers,  see John A. Brittain,  "The Incidence  of Social Security  Payroll 
Taxes,"  American Economic  Review, Vol.  61 (March  1971),  pp.  110-25. 
16. For a similar  argument,  which distinguishes  between  the temporary  effect of the 
corporation  income tax on the rate of inflation and its long-run  lack of effect on the 
distribution  of income, see my "The Incidence  of the Corporation  Income Tax in U.S, 
Manufacturing,  1925-62,"  American  Economic  Review,  Vol. 57 (September  1967),  p. 754. 114  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1971 
increase  in the tax rate will be borne by labor immediately  without any 
change  in the nominal  wage  or in employment.  The absence  of any signifi- 
cant change  in the labor  force  participation  rate of adult  males  during  the 
postwar  period  suggests  that  this  key  labor  force  group  may  have  an inelas- 
tic supply curve.17  The supply curve for labor may even be negatively 
sloped  if the income  effect  of a change  in the real  wage  dominates  the sub- 
stitution  effect.  In this case,  the short-run  effect  of a tax rate  increase  would 
be deflationary.  Finally,  the labor  supply  offered  by workers  could  in prin- 
ciple depend on the before-tax  rather  than the after-tax  real wage if 
workers  treat  the government  spending  financed  by the tax revenue  as part 
of their incomes.  This factor  is probably  not important  in fact, since the 
major  changes  in personal  income  tax rates  in the United  States  in 1964  and 
1968  were  associated  with stabilization  policy rather  than specific  changes 
in expenditures,  while  changes  in social  security  tax rates,  which  often  occur 
simultaneously  with increases  in social security  benefits,  are paid by indi- 
viduals  other  than those who receive  the benefits. 
Since  the theoretical  analysis  of the inflationary  impact  of a change  in di- 
rect  tax rates  is inconclusive,  and since  adequate  empirical  evidence  on the 
shape  of the labor  supply  curve  is unavailable,  the wage  equation  allows  the 
empirical  data to determine  the impact  of changes  in direct  taxes on the 
wage  rate.  Separate  coefficients  are estimated  for the impact  of taxes  paid 
by employers,  T8  (the effective  rate of employers'  social security  contribu- 
tions)  and  for  taxes  paid  by employees,  Te  (the  effective  rate  of the employee 
portion  of the social  security  tax and of the personal  income  tax).  For each 
kind of tax, the tax variables  are expressed  as growth  rates  in 1/(1 -T), 
where  T is defined  as the average  tax rate.  This  permits  the coefficients  esti- 
mated  in the wage equation  to be interpreted  as tax-shifting  parameters; 
they give the percentage  change  in wage rates  resulting  from a 1 percent 
change  in 1/(1 -  T).18  Because  wage negotiations  take place at intervals 
and are not continuous,  so that tax rate changes  may take a substantial 
length  of time  to affect  them,  both current  and  lagged  tax change  variables 
are tested  in the equations  estimated  below. 
17. While there is a significant  secular downward  trend in nonfarm private hours 
worked  during  the postwar  years,  the reduction  has been mainly  in industries  like retail 
trade in which the share of women employees  is high, while none has appeared  in the 
hours of manufacturing  production  workers. 
18. Specifically,  the rate of growth of the pretax  wage rate is a linear  function of the 
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The short-run  tax-shifting  parameters  could have important conse- 
quences  for the theory  of stabilization  policy.  A shifting  parameter  greater 
than zero implies  that a tax increase  designed  to raise  the unemployment 
rate  in order  to reduce  the rate  of inflation  will, in addition,  raise  the price 
level  associated  with  any  given  path  of unemployment.  In this case  a move- 
ment from a low unemployment  rate to a higher  unemployment  rate en- 
gineered  by tight monetary  policy (assuming  that it has no similar  unfa- 
vorable  consequences)  would be associated  with less inflation  than the 
same  unemployment  path engineered  by tight tax policy.'9  A corollary  in 
the 1971 economic situation would be that a low-tax, tight-money  mix 
would  lower  the rate of inflation  associated  with any given  unemployment 
rate,  as compared  with  an easy-money,  high-tax  policy.  On  the other  hand, 
zero estimates  of short-run  tax-shifting  parameters  imply  that fiscal  policy 
has no direct influence  on the Phillips  curve and affects  prices only in- 
directly  through  its impact  on output  and unemployment. 
WAGE  AND  PRICE  DATA 
A perennial  problem  in U.S. wage  research  is the erratic  behavior  of the 
data on compensation  per  manhour  (CMH).  There  are  large  measurement 
errors  in the series,  due partly  to the collection  of the compensation  and 
manhours  data by two different  government  agencies  following  different 
procedures.  A further  problem  is that the CMH series  measures  not only 
changes  in wage  rates,  which  are  the concern  of this  paper,  but also changes 
in average  compensation  arising  from  fluctuations  in output  between  high- 
wage  and  low-wage  industries  and in the percentage  of hours  paid at over- 
time rates.  To circumvent  these  problems  a new aggregate  wage  index  has 
been constructed  from underlying  data on average  straight-time  hourly 
earnings  by industry,20  using fixed 1963  industry  weights  in aggregating. 
Changes  in the new  fixed-weight  index  (w)  are  caused  only  by changes  in ac- 
19. This analysis  must  be qualified  to the extent that the higher  real interest  rate that 
accompanies  tight money raises capital costs and is passed forward in the form of 
higher prices. This effect may be of minor importance,  particularly  for a temporary 
increase  in the interest  rate that raises  the cost of new borrowing  but not of the existing 
liabilities  of the firm.  In any case, it is not taken  into account  in the price  equation  below, 
and thus is not measured  quantitatively  in this paper. 
20. The choice of 1963  weights  reflects  the central  position of this year in the sample 
period.  But wage  indexes  were  also calculated  with 1957  and 1967  weights  with no notice- 
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tual wage  rates,  not by changes  in industry  mix or overtime  hours.21  Figure 
1 compares  changes  in the new w series  with  changes  in CMH.  Changes  in 
the new series  seem  much  more  reasonable  than  those  in CMH;  in particu- 
lar,  the new  series  indicates  that  wage  changes  were  about  the same  in 1956 
as in 1957,  and  in late 1968  as in 1969,  unlike  the old series,  which  displays 
puzzling  peaks  in 1956  and 1968.22  A close  study  of the new  series  raises  the 
possibility  that some  of the fluctuations  in CMH  may  be statistical  aberra- 
tions. The increase  in CMH  relative  to w shown  in Figure 1 displays  pro- 
nounced peaks in even-numbered  years, particularly  1956, 1960, 1964, 
1966,  1968,  and 1970.  There  are  noticeable  troughs  in 1955,  1965,  and 1969. 
Government  statisticians  should  investigate  the possibility  that there  is a 
simple source of this peculiar  behavior,  such as different  procedures  for 
handling  weeks  that overlap  different  years.23  In order  to illustrate  the ef- 
fect of using  w in place  of CMH,  the first  wage  equation  presented  below  is 
fitted  using  both the CMH and w series.24 
While  the new  wage  series  is preferable  to CMH  in a study  of wage  deter- 
mination,  its partial  coverage  may  be undesirable  in a study  of price  deter- 
mination.  The  w  index  covers  both  blue-collar  and  white-collar  "production 
and  nonsupervisory  workers,"  about  four-fifths  (47.9  million  in 1970)  of all 
employees  in private  nonfarm  industries.  But  it excludes  all  income  received 
by managerial,  supervisory,  and  professional  employees,  and  for those  per- 
sons covered  it excludes  commissions,  bonuses,  tips, income  in kind, and 
21. To adjust  the fixed-weight  wage index for fringe  benefits,  w was multiplied  by the 
ratio of total compensation  of employees to wage and salary income, from the U.S. 
national  income accounts.  Changes  in overtime  outside of manufacturing  are not taken 
into account, since no overtime  data exist for the nonmanufacturing  sector. 
22. Perry  is particularly  disturbed  by the 1968-69 behavior  of CMH: "It is hard to 
think of any model, based on any view of the inflation  process,  that would not predict 
some speedup  of wage changes during 1969." See "Changing  Labor Markets,"  p. 430. 
23. In an equation that attempts to explain the four-quarter  rate of change in the 
CMH/w ratio as a function of lagged changes  in output (since overtime  and executive 
bonuses, which should be sensitive to output, are included in CMH but not in w), a 
significant  coefficient  is obtained on a dummy variable,  DE, which equals 1.0 in even 
years: 
9(CMHlo),  =  -0.0087  +  0.0065 DEt  +  0.2211 gQL 
(-4.1)  (4.8)  (4.8) 
R2 =  0.454, Durbin-Watson =  0.68, sample period =  1954:1-1970:4, 
growth rates expressed as four-quarter changes. 
24. As a parallel  to the fixed-weight  wage  index, in all regressions  the nonfarm  private 
deflator  is a fixed-weight  index of the deflators  for fifteen major  components  of GNP. 00 
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overtime wages.25  If  pricing decisions compensate even partially for 
changes  in these  excluded  elements,  the ratio  of CMH/w  is a determinant  of 
the price level and should be included  in the price equation  developed 
below. 
ANALYSIS  OF FITTED  WAGE EQUATIONS 
To summarize  the discussion  to this point, the fitted  wage equations  in 
this paper  incorporate  several  new features,  which  will be tested in com- 
parison  to approaches  suggested  heretofore  by other  authors  and myself: 
1. A new  fixed-weight  index  of nonfarm  private  hourly  earnings  adjusted 
for fringe  benefits,  including  employers'  social security  tax payments  (w). 
25. See Paul M. Schwab,  "Two Measures  of Purchasing  Power  Contrasted,"  Montdly 
Labor  Review,  Vol. 94 (April 1971),  p. 5. Coverage  is about 75 percent  in manufacturing 
and about 85 percent  in nonmanufacturing  industries. 
Table  1. Alternative  Wage  Equationsa 
Two-quarter  overlapping  changes 
Independent 
Labor  market  variables 
Total em-  Inverse of  Inverse of 
ployment  official  weighted  Unemploy-  Disguised  Unemnploy- 
rate of  unemploy-  uniemploy-  ment  Vacancy  unemploy-  ment rate 
manhours  ment rate  ment rate  dispersion  rate  ment rate  of hours 
Equation  Constant  1  -  UL  1/U  1/U*  DU  V  UD  U" 
(1)  -0.208  0.228  ...  ...  ....  ... 
(-6.5)  (6.6) 
(2)  -0.181  0.197  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
(-8.4)  (8.5) 
(3)  0.004  ...  0.00023  ...  ...  ...  -0.392  -0.205 
(0.7)  (1.3)  (-5.3)  (-2.1) 
(4)  0.001  ...  0.00025  ...  ...  ...  -0.343  -0.224 
(0.3)  (1.3)  (-4.3)  (-2.4) 
(5)  0.001  ...  0.00013  ...  ...  ...  -0.222  -0.276 
(0.2)  (0.6)  (-2.6)  (-2.4) 
(6)  0.003  ...  0.00003  ...  ...  ...  -0.230  -0.275 
(0.5)  (0.1)  (-2.8)  (-2.5) 
(7)  0.001  ...  0.00018  ...  ...  ...  -0.274  -0.197 
(0.2)  (1 .0)  (-3.8)  (-2.0) 
(8)  0.001  ...  0.00016  ...  ...  0.011  -0.274  -0.195 
(0.2)  (0.6)  (0.1)  (-3.7)  (-1.9) 
(9)  0.001  ...  ...  0.00013  ...  ...  -0.274  -0.180 
(0.4)  (1.1)  (-3.8)  (-1.8) 
(10)  -0.001  ...  ...  -0.00014  0.031  ...  -0.257  -0.100 
(-0.3)  (-0.8)  (2.1)  (-2.8)  (-1.0) 
(11)  -0.001  ...  ...  ...  0.018  ...  -0.278  -0.086 
(-0.4)  (2.3)  (-4.3)  (-1.0) 
Source: Author's estimates. 
Note:  The sample period is 1954:1-1970:4;  numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
a.  The dependent variable for equation (1) is the change in the ratio of adjusted compensation per manhour (see 
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2. New measures  of excess  labor  demand,  which  (a) "blow  up" a partial 
series  on vacancies  into an estimated  aggregate  vacancy  rate,  and  (b) intro- 
duce  the unemployment  of hours  (UH) and disguised  unemployment  (UD) 
separately  into the wage  equation. 
3. The use of lagged changes in the personal consumption  deflator 
(rather  than  the consumer  price  index)  to measure  the effect  of price  expec- 
tations  on wage  change,  with  weights  determined  from  equations  for inter- 
est rates  on instruments  of different  maturities. 
4. The distinction  between  the product  demand  effect  of prices  and the 
influence  of consumer  prices  on the expectations  of workers. 
5. The symmetric  treatment  of direct  labor  taxes  paid by employers  (T8) 
and  employees  (Te)  as elements  that  may  be shifted  forward  in the short  run 
to raise  before-tax  wage rates  and, subsequently,  product  prices. 
The  effect  of each  of these  innovations  is demonstrated  in Table  1, which 
variables 
Price variables  Other  variables 
Change in  Change in  Change in 
expected  expected  Change in  employers'  Standard  errors 
consumer  personal  product  social  Change in 
price  consumption  price  security  employees'  Guidepost  Estimated  Estimated 
indexb  deflator  variable  tax rate  tax rate  dummy  Durbin-  to  to 
gc*  gd.  gp  -  gd  9(1/1-T.)  g(1/1-T,)  DG  Watson  1970:4  1968:4 
0.466  ...  ...  0.736  ...  ...  1.11  0.00524  0.00522 
(4.8)  (1.9) 
0.463  ...  ...  0.939  ...  ...  1.01  0.00354  0.00357 
(7.0)  (3.5) 
0.354  ...  ...  1.096  ...  ...  1.20  0.00330  0.00332 
(5.1)  (4.2) 
...  0.577  ...  1.029  ...  ...  1.19  0.00333  0.00333 
(4.9)  (3.9) 
...  0.857  0.7250  0.967  ...  ...  1.27  0.00317  0.00326 
(5.6)  (2.5)  (3.8) 
...  0.891  0.7550  0.704  0.141  ...  1.38  0.00310  0.00316 
(5.9)  (2.7)  (2.5)  (2.0) 
. . .  0.756  0.4540  0.00  0.163  ...  1.43  0.00271  0.00273 
(5.6)  (1.7)  (2.7) 
. . .  0.760  0.4750  0.00  0.160  ...  1.46  0.00274  0.00275 
(5.5)  (1.6)  (2.5) 
. . .  0.741  0.4870  0.00  0.161  ...  1.44  0.00271  0.00272 
(5.4)  (2.3)  (2.6) 
. . .  0.521  0.6850  0.0 0  0.175  -0.001  1.53  0.00265  0.00265 
(3.0)  (2.6)  (2.8)  (-0.7) 
...  0.600  0.5960  0.00  0.169  ...  1.50  0.00261  0.00262 
(4.0)  (2.8)  (3.3) 
nomic Activity (1:1970),  pp.  1-41)  to  potential productivity; in equations (2) through (11), it is the change in  the 
ratio of the new fixed-weight wage series to potential productivity. 
b. See discussion in Ibid., p. 16. 
c.  This coefficient is the sum of a series of distributed lag coefficients. 120  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1971 
lists first, as equation  (1), the wage equation  from my earlier  article  and 
gradually  makes  the transition  to a new "final"  wage  equation.  The sample 
period  is 1954:1  to 1970:4,  an interval  with  a starting  date  chosen  to elimi- 
nate  the impact  of the  Korean  war  period  on the results,  and  with  an ending 
date  chosen  to make  maximum  use of recent  experience  for hypothesis  test- 
ing. The last column  of Table 1 shows  standard  errors  when  the equations 
are refitted  with 1969  and 1970  excluded;  they are  little changed  from  the 
standard  errors  for  the equations  fitted  to the full sample  period,  indicating 
that  the conclusions  drawn  from  Table  1 are  not sensitive  to the inclusion  of 
the most recent  two years  in the sample  period.  In all equations,  the depen- 
dent variable  is the two-quarter  change  in standard  unit labor cost-the 
wage rate divided  by standard  productivity.26 
Equation  (1) in Table  1 uses  the same  variables  as did  my article  last  year: 
the total  employment  rate  of manhours,  1 -  UL;  a measure  of the expected 
rate  of change  of the consumer  price  index,  gc*;  and  the change  in the social 
security tax rate, g(l/(l-T8)).27 Equation (2) shifts to the new wage variable, 
with  very  little  change  in the coefficients  but  a marked  reduction  in the stan- 
dard  error  of estimate.  In the next  equation  the total unemployment  rate  is 
split  into its three  components:  the official  rate  (which  is entered  as the un- 
employment  inverse,  1/U); the rate of disguised  unemployment,  UD;  and 
the unemployment  rate of hours, UH. The coefficients  on UD and U" are 
more  significant  statistically  than the official  unemployment  rate,  confirm- 
ing the suggestion  made  last  year  that  all three  forms  of unemployment,  not 
just  the official  unemployment  rate  alone,  must  be taken  into account  in the 
study of wage determination.  The important  role of  UD  and UH shown 
throughout  Table 1 indicates  that these variables  are serving  as useful 
proxies  for other  aspects  of labor  market  tightness,  such  as the total econ- 
omy-wide  vacancy  rate, for which  no direct  measurement  is available. 
The new price expectations  variable,  gde,  is introduced  in equation  (4) 
and differs  from  that in equation  (3) both in the interest  rate  equation  used 
to derive  the weights  (see equation  (A.5) in Appendix  A) and in the use of 
26. Equations for one-quarter  change were also calculated,  with little difference  in 
the results  but with marked  negative  serial correlation  in the residuals. 
27. The coefficients  differ  from those in the version published  last year because (a) 
variables  are in the form of two-quarter  rather  than four-quarter  changes; (b) the data 
have been revised;  (c) the sample  period  is different;  and (d) the output  growth  variable 
is no longer significant  due to the adjustment  of the dependent  variable  for changes  in 
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the personal  consumption  deflator  in place of the consumer  price  index.28 
There  is no appreciable  difference  between  the two equations  in their  ability 
to explain  the past, but the coefficient  on the new price  variable  is consid- 
erably  higher,  reflecting  the slower  rate of growth  of the PCD than of the 
CPI in the 1967-70  period  (that  is, to make  a given  numerical  contribution 
to the wage equation,  the weights  applied  to the change  in PCD must be 
larger  since  the size of the change  is smaller).  The difference  between  the 
growth rate of the NPD  and the PCD (g  -  gd)  is introduced in equation 
(5), where  the coefficient  listed is the sum of eight distributed  lag coeffi- 
cients.29  The result  is both a substantial  iinprovement  in fit and  an increase 
in the size of the coefficient  on the price expectation  variable,  indicating 
that the omission  of the marginal-revenue-product  effect  biases  downward 
the coefficient  on expected inflation in consumer  prices. The variable 
(g  -  gd)  plays no role in the inflationary  process  in the long run, since 
product  prices  and consumption  prices  grow  at about  the same  rate  over  a 
period  of years.  But  in the short  run,  it has a significant  effect  on the timing 
of wage  increases.30 
The effect  of direct  taxes  is explored  in the next  two equations.  Equation 
(6) indicates  that  in the current  period  about  one-seventh  of the impact  of a 
change in the direct tax rate paid by employees, g(1,(1-T6)),  which includes 
both social security  and personal  income  taxes, is shifted  forward  to em- 
ployers,  and six-sevenths  of the impact  is borne  by employees.  This con- 
trasts  with  the change  in the social  security  tax  paid  by employers,  g(l/(1-rT)), 
which  is borne  almost  entirely  by employers,  as they have only a limited 
ability  to affect  it within  the quarter  of tax change. 
To what  extent  do employers  manage  in subsequent  quarters  to shift  the 
burden  of the employer  tax back to employees  by granting  smaller  wage 
28. The weights  used  for the expectation  variable  in Table 1 are  based  on the equation 
for the Treasury  bill rate.  Table  2 illustrates  that the weights  from  the equation  explaining 
Treasury  bill rates yield a better explanation  of wage change  than the weights  from the 
equation explaining  the three- to five-year  bond rate. The weighting  pattern,  shown in 
detail in Table A-1, is virtually  identical  both in shape and in mean  lag to the weighting 
pattern obtained when past values of price change are included directly  in the wage 
equation; see Table 2, equation (19). 
29. In order  to minimize  the problem  of simultaneous  equation  bias that would arise 
from the effect  current  wages have on current  prices,  the current-period  coefficient  in the 
distributed  lag pattern  is constrained  to equal zero. 
30. The rates of,growth  of the NPD and PCD between 1956  and 1970 were virtually 
identical,  although  the NPD grew somewhat  faster before 1956. 122  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1971 
increases  than  they otherwise  would?  Sensible  estimates  of the lagged  effect 
of changes  in the employers'  tax could not be obtained  without  placing  a 
priori  restrictions  on the pattern  of lag coefficients.3'  For the final  estimates 
presented  in Table 1, the following  restrictions  were  imposed  on the coeffi- 
cients  of g(l/(l-T8)):  (1) The current  period  coefficient  is + 1.0 (as suggested 
by estimates  without  lags);  (2) earlier  period  coefficients  are  uniformly  neg- 
ative  (since  no theory  would  predict  that an increase  in the employer's  tax 
would  raise  before-tax  wages  further  after  being  fully  included  in the  before- 
tax wage in the initial  period  of the tax change);  (3) coefficients  of earlier 
periods  decline  linearly;  and (4) the sum of the earlier  period  coefficients 
add to no less than -  1.0 (since  without  this constraint,  estimates  add to 
larger  negative  numbers,  implying  that employers  reduce  wages  by more 
than  the whole  amount  of the tax).  The best-fitting  lag structure,  subject  to 
these constraints,  involves only the current and three earlier  quarters; 
the estimated  coefficients,  starting  with  the current  quarter,  are  + 1.0, -0.5, 
-0.33,  -0.17. 
In all cases  the same lag pattern  (with an unconstrained  sum of coeffi- 
cients)  was applied  to the change  in the employee  tax,  9(11(1T-T));  but in all 
cases  the lagged  employee  tax variable  was insignificant  and  the coefficient 
using  only  the current  quarter  is shown  in the table.  The result  of substitut- 
ing the constrained  lag pattern  on employers'  taxes  in equation  (7) is a very 
substantial  drop  in the standard  error  of the wage  equation.  The coefficient 
on the current-quarter  change  in the employee's  tax is quite  stable  through- 
out the equations  shown  in Table 1. 
31. In an initial  attempt  to explore  this problem,  I estimated  wage equations  in which 
past values of the change  in the employer  tax were  included  in addition  to current  values, 
with their impacts estimated in a relatively  unconstrained  way using the polynomial 
distributed  lag technique.  The results were not theoretically  sensible. The coefficients 
indicated  that, holding all other variables  constant,  in the first  year after an increase  in 
the employer  tax rate the burden  was more  than shifted  back to employees,  while  in the 
second and third years, wage increases  were higher  than would otherwise  be expected 
and the burden was shifted back to employers  again. The polynomial distributed  lag 
coefficients  summed  to  -  1.5 over the interval  between  the first  and fifth quarters,  and 
between  quarters  six and fourteen  added to +2.5. This strange  pattern  of coefficients  in 
all probability  reflected  a timing sequence  in wage negotiations  that the other variables 
in the wage equation could not explain and that was "picked  up" by the flexible dis- 
tributed  lag applied to the social security  tax. When the current  period coefficient  was 
constrained to equal + 1.0 and earlier quarters  were restricted  to take in declining 
negative weights, the coefficients  of the earlier  quarters  summed  to between -  1.5 and 
-2.0  depending  'on the number of lags permitted,  implying  an implausible  degree of 
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The final four equations  explore  the contributions  of alternative  labor 
market  variables.  The vacancy  rate (V), developed  from partial  data on 
nonagricultural  job openings,  appears  to make no contribution  at all, as 
is demonstrated  in equation  (8). Neither aggregate  unemployment  mea- 
sure-the  inverse  of the official  unemployment  rate, 1/U, or the inverse 
of Perry's  weighted  unemployment  rate, 1/U*'-is significant  alongside  the 
partial  measures,  UD and UH,  as is evident  from  equations  (3) through  (9). 
Perry's  unemployment  dispersion  variable,  however,  makes a statistically 
significant  contribution  in equations  (10) and (11). The drop  in the coeffi- 
cient  on the expected  price  variable  between  equations  (9) and  (10) suggests 
that part  of the acceleration  of wage  increases  in 1968-70  that is attributed 
to the price  variable  in equation  (9) is in fact due  to the growing  dispersion 
of unemployment  during  these  years. 
Equation  (10) implies  a less steeply  sloped  long-run  Phillips  curve  trade- 
off between  unemployment  and inflation  than equation  (9) and confirms 
Perry's  conclusion  that the long-run  Phillips  curve  has shifted  to the right 
in the 1960s.  The  small  and  insignificant  coefficient  on the guidepost  dummy 
in equation  (10) confirms  the conclusion  in my previous  article  that the 
Kennedy-Johnson  guideposts  were  ineffective  in reducing  the rate of wage 
increase.  Equation  (10) is unsatisfactory  as the "final"  wage equation  be- 
cause  the coefficient  on the weighted  unemployment  inverse  has an incor- 
rect  sign  and  because  the guidepost  dummy  is insignificant.  The  equation  is 
therefore  refitted  as equation  (I1) with the two variables  1/U* and DG 
excluded. 
The "final"  wage  equation  (11) differs  from  the outcome  of previous  re- 
search  in several  respects.  Most notable is the exclusion  of any conven- 
tional unemployment  concept,  either  weighted  or unweighted.  This does 
not mean that the Phillips  curve has disappeared,  however,  because  the 
DU, UD and U" variables  are all highly  correlated  with official  unemploy- 
ment and are effective  proxies  for net excess  labor demand.  But the rela- 
tionship  of these  variables  to the official  unemployment  concept  has shifted 
since  the late 1950s,  since  DU was  higher  and UD  was  lower  in 1970  relative 
to the official  unemployment  rate  than  they  had  been  in previous  recessions. 
While these variables  thus help to explain  the absence  of any noticeable 
slowdown  in wage  increases  in 1970,  this  result  is not due  to the inclusion  of 
1970  in the sample  period  of the regressions;  the coefficients  on DU and UD 
are virtually  identical  in regressions  fitted  to the period  ending  in 1968:4. 
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oped previously  by others  and myself, are the dynamic  pattern  of coeffi- 
cients  on changes  in employers'  social  security  contributions,  the small  but 
significant  positive  coefficient  on direct  taxes  paid  by employees,  the signif- 
icant  influence  of the demand-price  effect,  and  the relatively  high  coefficient 
of 0.6 on the rate  of expected  inflation.  Since  this last result  has an impor- 
tant role in determining  the slope of the long-run  Phillips  curve,  the sensi- 
tivity of the estimate  to the use of alternative  expected  price  variables  was 
tested. 
Table  2 presents  alternative  versions  of equation  (11)  fitted  with  eight  dif- 
ferent  variables  representing  the expected  rate of inflation.  Equations  (12) 
through  (17)  in Table  2 are  fitted  for  two alternative  price  indexes-the per- 
sonal consumption  deflator  and the consumer  price  index-and for three 
different  sets of weights-a  simple one-period  lag, and distributed  lag 
weights  based  on the two interest  rate  equations  of Appendix  A. Equation 
(13) in Table  2 is identical  to equation  (11) in Table 1. For both price  in- 
dexes  the results  based on the Treasury  bill weights  are better  than those 
based  on either  the simple  one-period  lag or the weights  from  the three-  to 
five-year  bond equation,  but there  is no difference  at all in goodness  of fit 
between  the two price  indexes.  The  results  based  on the PCD are  preferred 
in this paper,  since  the closely  similar  secular  rates of growth  of the PCD 
Table  2. Effect  of Alternative  Price Expectations  Variables  on Basic 
Wage  Equation  with  Dependent  Variable  w/q' 
Two-quarter  overlapping  changes 
Price 
Equation  Price  expectation  Standard 
number  indexx  Source  of weightsb  coefficient  error 
(12)  PCD  t -1  only  0.378  0.00270 
(13)  PCD  TB  0.600  0.00261 
(14)  PCD  3-5  0.528  0.00271 
(15)  CPI  t-1  only  0.258  0.00269 
(16)  CPI  TB  0.480  0.00258 
(17)  CPI  3-5  0.431  0.00270 
(18)c  CPI  Livingston  survey  0.215  0.00274 
(19)  PCD  Estimated  in wage equation  0.765  0.00258 
Source:  Author's estimates. 
Note:  The sample period is 1954:1-1970:4. 
a.  PCD is the personal consumption deflator; CPI, the consumer price index. 
b.  TB is the Treasury bill rate; 3-5, the rate on three- to five-year government bonds. For a description 
of the Livingston surlvey,  see text. 
c.  In equation (18), U" took on the wrong sign and was excluded in the version reported on here. Robert J. Gordon  125 
and the NPD explained  in the price equation  allow us to feed the NPD 
directly  into the wage equation  in forecasting  experiments.  The CPI in- 
creased  at a substantially  faster  rate than either  the NPD or PCD during 
the 1967-70 period and cannot be used without a separate  equation  to 
explain  deviations  between  the growth  rates of the CPI and  NPD. 
Equation  (18)  presents  a test of considerable  interest.  Some  critics  object 
that expectations  may not be a simple  function  of a variable's  past values, 
as assumed  in this paper,  but may  be based  in part on other,  outside  infor- 
mation.  Fortunately,  a set of actual  price  expectation  estimates  is available 
in the results  of a survey  conducted  for the last twenty-five  years  by J. A. 
Livingston,  formerly  the financial  editor of the Philadelphia  Bulletin. At 
six-month  intervals,  Livingston  has surveyed  a panel of approximately 
fifty  business  economists  regarding  the change  in consumer  prices  (as well 
as wages,  output,  and other  variables)  that they anticipated  over the next 
six and  the next twelve  months.  Livingston  has made  his data available  to 
me, and  the basic  wage  equation  has  been  estimated  with  the rate  of change 
in the price  level expected  by the Livingston  panel  used as a proxy  for the 
rate of expected  inflation.32 
An examination  of the Livingston  index  indicates  that the survey  panel 
has made significant  underestimates  of the future  rate of inflation  during 
several  subperiods  of the postwar  years. Rational workers  should formu- 
late wage  demands  both to take account  of inflation  expected  in the future 
and to make up for past underestimates  of the inflation  rate. Hence, the 
difference  between  the rate  of change  of actual  prices  and  expected  prices  in 
the most recent  period  was tested  in addition  to the rate of change  of the 
Livingston  index  in the wage equation.  This "catch-up"  variable  was sta- 
tistically  insignificant,  however,  and  has been  excluded  from  equation  (18). 
The coefficient  on changes  in price  expectations  is much  lower  in equation 
(18) than in the CPI equation  based  on Treasury  bill weights  (16), but the 
32. For use in the quarterly  equations, the change between the price level in the 
present month and that expected after a six-month  interval  was interpolated  so as to 
convert  the semiannual  series  into a quarterly  series.  Because  changes  were  reported,  for 
example,  between  the actual  November  figure  and the anticipated  June  figure,  anticipated 
annual  rates of change  over the seven-month  interval  were  computed  by multiplying  the 
expected  change by 12/7. On the hypothesis  that the one-quarter  rate of change in the 
wage rate is a function of the rate of change of prices  expected  now for the following 
six months, a two-quarter  moving average  of the annualized  Livingston  series was the 
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statistical  fit is worse,  perhaps  suggesting  that  the estimate  of price  expecta- 
tions reflected  in financial  markets  is a more  accurate  reflection  of worker 
sentiments  than the estimate  by a panel of business  economists. 
In the final  equation  in Table  2, the lags on expected  price  changes  are 
estimated  in the wage equation  itself rather  than from an interest  rate 
equation.  The  distributed  lag weights  are  subject  to the same  constraints  as 
those  in the interest  rate  equation  used  to obtain  the expected  price  variable 
for  the other  wage  equations.  Equation  (19)  is virtually  identical  to equation 
(13) in goodness  of fit, in the shape  of the lag distribution,  and  in the mean 
lag of the lag pattern  (4.1 quarters  as compared  with 4.4 quarters  in the 
Treasury  bill equation  described  in Appendix  Table  A-1).  The  major  differ- 
ence  is that the sum  of the coefficients  in equation  (19) is somewhat  larger 
than that in equation  (13). The similarity  of equations  (19) and  (13) offers 
indirect  evidence  that  the price  expectations  of workers  over  the near  term 
are similar  to those reflected  in financial  markets.  Equation  (13)-that  is, 
equation  (1)  of Table  1-rather than  (19) is the choice  for simulation  and 
forecasting  experiments  because  it is less  likely  to contain  biased  coefficient 
estimates. 
The coefficient  on the expected  price  level in my basic wage  equation  is 
0.600.  How confident  can  we be that  this  value  is significantly  different  from 
unity,  and  thus  that  the long-run  Phillips  curve  has a negative  slope?  Table 
3 shows  the sum of squared  residuals  for the final  wage  equation  when  the 
coefficient  on the expected  rate  of inflation  is constrained  at different  values 
between  0.1 and 1.2. A 5 percent  confidence  interval  stretches  between 
coefficient  values  of 0.3 and 0.9. Because  of the wide range  of parameter 
values  within  the 5 percent  confidence  interval,  the estimate  of 0.6 in the 
final  wage  equation  cannot  be regarded  as precise,  but it is significantly  dif- 
ferent  from  unity  at the 1 percent  level.33 
The Determination  of Prices 
Once  the wage  is determined  by one of the  final  wage  equations,  the basic 
pace of the inflationary  process  is bounded  within  a fairly  narrow  region. 
33. The statement is based on an 5: test carried out according to  the procedure 
recommended  in Franklin  M. Fisher,  "Tests  of Equality  between  Sets of Coefficients  in 
Two Linear  Regressions:  An Expository  Note," Econometrica,  Vol. 38 (March 1970), 
p. 363. Robert J. Gordon  127 
Table 3.  Sensitivity of Errors in Basic Wage Equation  to Alternative 
Constraints  on Coefficient  of Price Expectations Variable 
Sum of squared 
Coefficient  residuals 
0.1  0.000476 
0.2  0.000449 
0.3  0.000428 
0.4  0.000413 
0.5  0.000404 
0.6  0.000401 
0.7  0.000404 
0.8  0.000413 
0.9  0.000428 
1.0  0.000449 
1.1  0.000476 
1.2  0. o0509 
Source: Author's estimates. 
The price  equation  in this paper  tests the hypothesis  that in the long run 
the relative  shares  of labor  and  nonlabor  income  are  constant.34  An equiv- 
alent statement  is that in the long run the price  level is "marked  up" by 
a fixed fraction  over "standard"  unit labor cost (w/q'), estimated  as the 
wage  rate  (w)  divided  by an estimate  of productivity  at a "standard"  level  of 
capacity  utilization  (q').  In the short  run,  however,  the price  equation  intro- 
duces  four basic  hypotheses  to explain  fluctuations  in the ratio of price  to 
standard  unit  labor  cost. 
1. Excess demandfor commodities.  The mark-up fraction is postulated 
to depend  on the excess  demand  for  commodities.35  Firms  are  relatively  un- 
inhibited  in raising  prices  when  they  are  straining  to produce  output  during 
periods  of a high backlog of unfilled  orders  relative  to their capacity  to 
produce.  They  become  more  cautious  about  raising  prices  in the  later  stages 
of a business  expansion,  after  they have worked  off their order  backlog. 
The crucial  role of order  backlogs  is introduced  into the price  equation  by 
34. For evidence  from cross-section  data that the elasticity  of substitution  between 
labor and capital  is unity  in U.S. manufacturing,  see Paul Zarembka,  "On  the Empirical 
Relevance  of the CES  Production  Function,"  Review  of Economics  and  Statistics,  Vol. 52 
(February  1970),  pp. 47-53. 
35. Since the level of excess demand enters multiplicatively  with the level of labor 
cost in determining  the price  level, the rate of growth  of excess  demand  enters  additively 
with the growth of labor cost in determining  the rate of growth of the price  level. 128  Brookings Papelrs  on Economic Activity, 1:1971 
allowing the mark-up fraction to vary as a function of the ratio of unfilled 
orders to capacity (UF/K).36 
2. Lags. Even if the level of excess demand is constant, the ratio of price 
to standard unit labor cost may fluctuate in the short run if the response of 
price to a change in the wage rate occurs with a lag. In this case a sudden 
increase in the growth rate of wages will temporarily raise unit labor costs 
until sufficient  time has passed for prices to catch up. To estimate the length 
of this lag, the price equation fits a series of distributed lag coefficients to 
current and past changes in standard unit labor cost (w/q'). 
3. Productivity deviations. In this paper the level of productivity at a 
"standard" level of capacity utilization (q') is assumed to lie along a trend 
line  passing through cyclical peaks in productivity. Estimates made by 
price setters of standard productivity may diverge from this trend line for a 
substantial  period. If price setters pay some attention to deviations of actual 
productivity from trend, but do not base price decisions exclusively on ac- 
tual productivity, prices will respond to changes in the ratio of actual to 
trend productivity (q/q'). This variable, like the wage rate (w), is assumed to 
influence price decisions with a lag, since price setters may wait several 
quarters  to see if a shortfall in productivity continues before raising prices. 
4.  Other compensation.  The wage index explained in the wage equation 
excludes many forms of compensation that are part of total labor costs. 
To the extent that the price level is set in relation to total compensation 
rather than solely to the wages and salaries of production and nonsuper- 
visory workers, the rate of change of prices should depend on the rate 
of change in the ratio of total compensation per manhour to the wage index 
(CMH/w). If broader coverage were the only difference  between the series, 
a coefficient of unity on this ratio would mean that price setters adjust com- 
pletely for changes in these other forms of compensation. But the fitted 
coefficient might be less than unity to the extent that a portion of changes 
36. This measure was first suggested by George deMenil, "Vintage Production 
Functions, Monopolistic Competition,  and Price Determination"  (unpublished  manu- 
script, July 30, 1969). Following deMenil, the ratio of unfilled  orders  to capacity used 
here is "detrended,"  that is, computed  as the ratio of actual UF/K to a trend line ex- 
tended  between  peaks  in 1952:3, 1956:3, and 1966:4. The UF/K measure  is used here  in 
preference  to the ratio of new orders to shipments,  the excess demand  variable  in my 
previous  paper,  because  the latter  reaches  its peak  about a year  before  the former  in most 
business  expansions  and has little correlation  with price  behavior  after 1951.  The choice 
of UF/K makes  sense if firms  regard  fluctuations  in new orders  as transitory  unless the 
integral  of new orders  is substantial  enough to raise unfilled  orders  relative  to capacity. Robert J. Gordon  129 
in CMH/w reflects changes in industry mix or errors of measurement. The 
effect of this variable is largely cyclical, since the ratio of  compensation 
per manhour to the wage index has a secular increase of only 0.2 percent 
per annum in the 1954-70 period. 
Beyond these four hypotheses, other variables might have been included. 
Since output in the nonfarm private economy is produced with capital and 
materials as well as with labor, the unit costs of these other inputs should 
have an influence on price. But additional explanatory variables require ad- 
ditional equations in turn to explain them, introducing an undesirable de- 
gree of complication into a wage-price model that is designed to be simple 
and easily manipulated. In place of explicit treatment of other costs, I rely 
on the assumption of constant income shares to tie the price level in the 
long run to unit labor cost. Given constant shares, a doubling of unit labor 
cost must cause the price level to double; unit capital cost must also double, 
an event that will occur through some combination of an increase in the 
price of capital services and the accumulation of added capital per unit of 
output. Thus the estimate of the elasticity of the price level to changes in 
standard unit labor cost should be expected a priori to be unity if the as- 
sumption of constant shares is valid. 
The final fitted price equation is: 
(20)  gv, =  0.0002 +  0.601g(cMHlw)c  +  0.024g(UF/K)t  +  1.060g(wlq')L 
(0.2)  (3.3)  (3.0)  (5.9) 
-0.243g(q/q')  L 
(-2.0) 
R3 =  0.742, Durbin-Watson  statistic =  2.21, 
standard  error = 0.00214. 
The sample period is 1954:2-1970:4,  all variables are in the form of one- 
quarter changes, and the subscript L indicates that the coefficient shown is 
the sum of a series of distributed lag coefficients estimated as described in 
Appendix A;37 the numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
The sum of the coefficients on standard unit labor cost, w/q', is slightly 
greater than the a priori value of unity, but this does not imply that in the 
long run there will necessarily be a reduction in labor's share of income, be- 
cause the elasticity of price to a change in the ratio of CMH to w is sig- 
nificantly less than unity. Thus the ratio of CMH to price-that  is, labor's 
37. To limit the number  of parameters  estimated,  a lag in the effect of 9(cAmI.I)t was 
allowed by including  it in the form of a four-quarter  change  at a quarterly  rate. 130  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1971 
share-can remain  constant  even with a 1.06  elasticity  of price  to changes 
in w/q' if CMH/w  increases  fast enough.  For instance,  the parameter  val- 
ues imply  that labor's  share  will remain  constant  at rates  of growth  of 3.0 
percent  per annum  for w/q' and of 0.4 percent  for CMH/w, in which  case 
both price  and CMH would  grow  at 3.4 percent  per annum. 
The distributed  lag coefficients  indicate  that  about  two-thirds  of the ulti- 
mate effect  of a change  in wages on the price  level occurs  within  the first 
year.  About  two-thirds  of the ultimate  effect  of a change  in q/q' also occurs 
during  the first  year.  Increases  in actual  productivity  cause  price  setters  to 
raise their estimate  of standard  productivity,  which  in turn reduces  their 
estimate  of standard  unit  labor  cost and hence  the price  they decide  to set, 
given  the values  of other  variables.  The increase  in the ratio of unfilled  or- 
ders  to capacity  was constrained  to affect  the price  level  immediately,  after 
experiments  suggested  that  lags are  short. 
Taken together,  the fitted coefficients  in the price equation  suggest a 
cyclical  pattern  in which  the dominant  inflationary  force  in the early  stages 
of a business  expansion  is an increase  in the ratio of unfilled  orders  to ca- 
pacity, somewhat  moderated  by above-average  increases  in productivity. 
Then, as the backlog  of unfilled  orders  is run down and the inflationary 
pressure  from  this source  subsides,  prices  are pushed  up by a reduction  in 
productivity  growth  and the effect  of wage  increases.  The equation  implies 
that  profits,  which  depend  on the ratio  of the price  level  to actual  unit  labor 
cost, rise rapidly  in the beginning  of an expansion  when excess demand 
pushes  up price  while  unit  labor  cost growth  is moderated  by rapid  produc- 
tivity advance.  But subsequently  there  is a period  of profit  squeeze  as the 
declining  pressures  of demand  are reflected  in moderated  price increases 
while  a slowdown  in productivity  growth  boosts  unit labor  costs. 
Simulations  and  Predictions 
THE EXPLANATION  OF WAGE  AND  PRICE BEHAVIOR,  1964-70 
The wage rate. In the left frame of Figure 2, the actual four-quarter 
change in the fixed-weight index of standard unit labor cost is compared 
with predicted values from equation (11) of Table 1. The equation is able 
accurately to trace the acceleration in the rate of increase in the wage rate 
between'late 1964 and early 1966, the slower rate of increase in 1966, the 
rapid acceleration  between early 1967 and early 1969, and the leveling off in Robert J. Gordon  131 
1969-70. The major errors lie in a tendency to overpredict  in late 1966 and 
1967 and to underpredict  in 1968. Unlike the equations developed last year, 
there is no tendency to underpredict  wages during 1970. In fact, the decel- 
eration in wage increases predicted for 1970 (from 4.29 percent in the four 
quarters ending in 1969:4 to 4.23 percent in the four quarters ending in 
1970:4) is less than the actual deceleration from 4.20 to 3.95 percent. 
The right frames of Figure 2 decompose the fitted value from the wage 
equation into the separate  contributions of each variable. The separate con- 
tributions, when added vertically, equal the fitted value in the left frame. 
The contribution of price expectations was gradually to push upward the 
rate of increase of wages. This variable explains why the increase in wages 
did not slow down markedly in the 1970 recession, since the growth of the 
expected price level was more rapid in 1970 than in any earlier year. The 
other variables explain why the acceleration of the rate of increase in wages 
between 1964 and 1969 was irregular  and did not follow the smooth path of 
the price expectations variable. 
The middle frame on the right shows the contribution of the unemploy- 
ment dispersion variable in pushing up the rate of increase of predicted 
wages in  1964-66 and again in  1968-69. That frame also illustrates the 
substantial role of disguised unemployment, which pushed up the rate of 
wage inflation throughout the period and also moderated the decline of 
wage increases in 1970. The contributions of hours unemployment and the 
product-demand-price  effect were very small during this period. The top 
frame on the right illustrates the impact of changes in tax rates on the tim- 
ing of wage changes. The increase in social security taxes paid by employers 
had a positive influence on the wage rate in 1966 and an offsetting negative 
effect in 1967. The major impact of changes in the employee tax rate was 
negative after the 1964 cut in the personal income tax rate, and positive 
both after the 1966 boost in social security taxes and again in late 1968 and 
early 1969 after the introduction of the tax surcharge in July 1968. The 
gradual reduction in the surcharge moderated wage increases in late 1969 
and throughout 1970. In simulations reported in the concluding section, I 
calculate the net inflationary  effect of both employers' and employees' taxes 
when the wage and price equations interact. 
The  price level. The four-quarter  rate of inflation predicted by the price 
equation when actual wage changes are used in predicting prices is shown 
as the dashed line in the left frame of Figure 3; there these predicted values 
are compared with the actual values, illustrated by a solid line. The price 132  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1971 
Figure 2.  Actual and Predicted Changes in Standard  Unit Labor Cost, 
and the Contribution  of Each Determinant, 1964-70 
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equation tracks the actual experience very closely during the 1964-70 pe- 
riod, with a particularly accurate set of fitted values between 1964:1 and 
1968:2. The period 1968:3-1970:1  is characterized  by an overprediction of 
the inflation rate by an average annual rate of 0.34 percent; the only sub- 
stantial underprediction  is in the last quarter of 1970. The equation accur- 
ately traces the temporary increase in the rate of inflation in late 1964, the 
decline in late 1965, the rapid acceleration during 1966, the plateau of 1967, 
and a second phase of acceleration between early 1968 and mid-1969. Un- 
like that estimated last year, the equation has no tendency to  predict a 
decline in the rate of inflation in 1970, and in fact predicts an inflation rate 
in the four quarters ending in 1970:4 (4.70 percent) higher than that pre- 
dicted for the four quarters  ending in 1969:4 (4.55 percent). 
The right portion of Figure 3 illustrates the contributions of the four in- Robert J. Gordon  133 
Figure 2 (continued) 
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Figure 3.  Actual and Predicted Changes in Price Level, and 
Contribution  of Each Determinant, 1964-70 
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dependent variables to the rate of inflation predicted by the price equation. 
Increases in standard unit labor cost were the dominant force during most 
of the period. But productivity deviations played a role in restraining  infla- 
tion during the early stages of the business expansion in 1964-66 and in 
aggravating the inflation during 1969-70. And both the ratio of unfilled 
orders to capacity and the ratio of compensation to wages pushed up the 
price level in 1964-65 before there was any increase in standard unit labor 
cost. In a parallel fashion, both variables contributed to the prediction of a 
reduction in price inflation relative to the increase in labor cost during 1970. 
The dashed line in the left frame of Figure 3 is not a prediction of the Robert J. Gordon  135 
Figure 3 (continued) 
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complete wage-price model, but only of the price equation itself when the 
wage rate is held exogenous. How well does the model track when the wage 
and price equations are allowed to interact? For the complete model simu- 
lation of the 1964-70 period, the wage and price equations employed are 
fitted only through 1968, in order to illustrate the predictions that the model 
would have made at the end of 1968 if accurate predictions of the exogenous 
variables had been available. Employing only information on the history of 
prices through 1963:4, and the values of all exogenous variables  in the wage 
and price equations, but generating its  own estimates of wages and ex- 
pected prices, the wage-price model is able to track the path of actual infla- 
tion during the 1964-70 period with considerable accuracy, as shown by the 
dotted line in the left frame of Figure 3. While the complete model overpre- 
dicts inflation by a moderate amount between 1968:3  and 1970:1, little 
decline is predicted in the rate of inflation in 1970. The predicted rate of 
inflation in the four quarters ending in 1970:4 is 4.57 percent, almost the 
same as the 4.59 percent rate in the four quarters ending in 1969:4.38 The 
extension of the sample period to 1970 causes very little change in the co- 
efficients on the independent variables in the wage and price equations. A 
complete model simulation for 1964-70, using the equations fitted to the 
longer sample period, produces predicted values virtually identical to the 
curve in Figure 3 labeled, "full simulation, 1968 coefficients." 
TRADEOFFS BETWEEN UNEMPLOYMENT  AND  INFLATION 
The estimated wage and price equations can be combined to calculate 
the long-run tradeoff between inflation and unemployment. In this calcula- 
tion no role is played by variations in the ratio of actual to standard pro- 
ductivity, the ratio of unfilled orders to capacity, or the ratio of product 
to consumption prices, all of which are assumed to be constant in the long 
run if the unemployment rate stays constant. It is assumed that all tax 
rates remain constant and that the ratio of total compensation per manhour 
to the wage rate of production workers increases at its secular postwar rate 
of 0.2 percent per year. With these assumptions the wage equation is sub- 
stituted into the price equation, and when the rate of expected inflation is 
set equal to  the actual rate of inflation (since by definition in long-run 
equilibrium the actual and expected rates of inflation are equal), then 
38. The drrors  in the dynamic  simulation  do not cumulate.  The predicted  level of the 
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(21)  gp =  -0.0020  +  0.0965DU  -  1.48UD -  0.455U(1. 
All coefficients have been adjusted to  apply to  annual rates of inflation. 
While this long-run price equation cannot be plotted on a single diagram 
as it stands, the equations of Appendix B can be used to calculate the values 
of the labor market variables in equation (21) that would accompany any 
given level of the official unemployment rate; hence the inflation rate that 
would be  associated with this  given official unemployment rate can be 
calculated.39 
The result is the long-run tradeoff curve drawn as a solid line in Figure 4. 
The curve is somewhat steeper than that derived in my article last year and 
is slightly curved, due to  the nonlinear relationship of total  and official 
unemployment shown in Appendix B. In the interval between 2.6 and 3.7 
percent unemployment, a 1 percentage point change in the unemployment 
rate is associated with a 2.4 percentage  point change in the rate of inflation; 
in the 3.7 to 4.9 percent unemployment interval, with a 1.7 percentage  point 
change in inflation; in the 4.9 to 6.3 interval, with a 1.4 percentage point 
change in inflation; and in the 6.3 to 7.8 percent interval, with a 1.3 per- 
centage point change in inflation. The slope of the curve below 3.5 percent 
unemployment or above 6 percent unemployment is not firmly based on 
the historical data, of course, since the unemployment rate remained within 
those bounds for all but brief intervals during the sample period.40 
The wage-price model supports Perry's finding that the Phillips curve 
shifted to the right between the mid-1950s and late 1960s. The long-run 
Phillips curve depicted in Figure 4 would be in a more favorable position 
with the unemployment dispersion of the mid-1950s. To achieve a steady 
long-run inflation rate of 3.0 percent with today's unemployment dispersion 
requires an unemployment rate of 5.2 percent, whereas this inflation rate 
39. The equations  shown in Appendix  B can calculate only the sum of UD and U" 
associated  with various  levels of official  unemployment,  not the breakdown  of this sum 
between UD and U", and so the average  of the coefficients  on UD and UH  in equation 
(21) is applied  to this estimate of UD +  UH. 
40. The discussion  of wage determination  above indicated  that a fairly  wide range of 
price  expectation  coefficients  in the wage equation  is consistent  with the historical  data 
Table 3 reports  the calculation  of a version  of the final wage equation  in which  the price 
expectation  coefficient  was constrained  to be 1.0. Although the significance  test of that 
table still gives a value of 1.0 less than a 1 percent probability,  this equation can be 
substituted into the price equation to  determine the "natural"  unemployment  rate 
below  which  inflation  would  continuously  accelerate.  With  the unemployment  dispersion 
that  characterizes  the United States  in the early  1970s,  the computation  yields  a "natural" 
unemployment  rate of 5.5 percent. 138  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1971 
Figure 4.  Long-Run and Short-Run  Tradeoffs between Unemployment 
and Inflation 
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was consistent with a 4.1 percent unemployment rate with the dispersion 
of 1956. Or, putting it another way, the actual average 1956 unemployment 
rate of 4.1 percent is associated with a long-run inflation rate of 3.0 percent 
with the  1956 level of unemployment dispersion, but with a 4.9 percent 
long-run rate of inflation with the level of dispersion that (according to 
equation (B.10) in Appendix B) would accompany an official unemploy- 
ment rate of 4.1 percent during the next several years.4' 
In the short run, the change in the inflation rate resulting from a change 
in the unemployment rate is much smaller than is suggested by the long-run 
tradeoff curve. From a starting point of 1970:4, short-run tradeoff curves 
can be calculated for alternative unemployment rates in future years, as 
shown in Figure 4.42 First, beginning in 1971: 1, several simulations were 
calculated with different rates of output growth chosen to yield (by means 
of the equations of Appendix B) rates of unemployment ranging between 
5.0 and 7.6 percent in  1971:4. The inflation rate in 1971:4 that the full 
wage-price model predicts would accompany each of these unemployment 
rates is plotted in Figure 4  as the line marked "1971  :4 tradeoff." This 
shows that from the starting position of 1970:4 any unemployment rate in 
1971:4 between 5.0 and 7.6 percent would be accompanied by virtually 
the same inflation rate-about  3.6 percent. 
If the same experiment is carried out for a somewhat longer period, the 
inflation-unemployment tradeoff line becomes steeper and begins to  ap- 
proach the long-run tradeoff curve. From the same starting point of 1970:4, 
simulations were calculated with different rates of output growth chosen 
to  yield rates of unemployment ranging between 3.0  and 7.6 percent in 
1974:4.  The line marked "1974:4  tradeoff" indicates that, beginning in 
1970:4,  the choice by policy makers of  a path  of  output growth rapid 
enough to  reach 3.0 percent unemployment by  1974:4  would cause an 
inflation rate in that quarter of 4.9 percent as compared with a slower rate 
of 2.5 percent at that time if output growth were restricted to the slower 
path needed to keep the unemployment rate constant at 6.0 percent. Fi- 
41. The wage equation with a unitary  coefficient  on price expectations  yields a 5.1 
percent "natural"  rate of unemployment  with 1956 dispersion,  as opposed to the 5.5 
percent  rate with 1970  dispersion.  The rightward  shift in the Phillips  curve  referred  to in 
the text is similar  in magnitude  to that calculated  by Perry,  "Changing  Labor  Markets." 
42. The "starting  point" of 1970:4 assumes  the actual rate of employment,  but the 
rate of inflation  is that predicted  by the wage-price  model in a simulation  that begins in 
1969:4. All the simulations  reported  on in this section are continuations,  along different 
outlook and unemployment  paths, of this initial five-quarter  simulation. 140  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1971 
nally,  each  of these  simulations  was continued  after  1974:4  with an output 
growth  rate chosen  to keep the unemployment  rate constant  at the level 
reached  in 1974:4.  The "1980:4  tradeoff"  line shows  that a given  difference 
in the unemployment  rate between  the simulations  is associated  with a 
growing  differential  in the inflation  rate over  the period  between  1974  and 
1980.  But even by 1980:4,  ten years  after  the initial  divergence  of the out- 
put paths  in the various  simulations,  the tradeoff  curve  has not yet reached 
its long-run  position. 
FORECASTS  FOR  ALTERNATIVE  PATHS 
OF  ECONOMIC  RECOVERY 
Forecasts  of the future  behavior  of prices can be calculated  from the 
estimated  wage  and  price  equations  when  the model  of Appendix  B is used 
to generate  forecasts  of all explanatory  variables,  a process  that requires 
information  only on the projected  path of growth  of real output.  Alterna- 
tive forecasts  are  illustrated  in Figure  5 for two paths  of recovery  from  the 
economic  situation  of 1970:4. 
Path A traces  rapid  recovery  to a 3.9 percent  unemployment  rate  by the 
end of 1972, which requires  a 7.5 percent  annual  rate of output growth 
between  1970:4 and 1972:4,  followed  thereafter  by growth  at the 4.3 per- 
cent assumed  rate of growth  of potential  output. 
Path B is a more  cautious  route  to full employment.  Output  grows  at the 
potential  rate of 4.3 percent  until  the end of 1972,  followed  by three  years 
of 6.4 percent  annual  output  growth  until the end of 1975. 
The two paths generate  different  rates of inflation  during  the recovery 
to full employment,  since the long period of high unemployment  along 
path B leads  to a reduction  in the expected  rate of inflation,  which  in turn 
moderates  the wage demands  that accompany  any given unemployment 
rate as the economy  returns  to full employment.  But eventually,  after  the 
economy settles  down at a 3.8 percent  unemployment  rate, the inflation 
rate of path B begins  to approach  that of path A. These  simulations  were 
not continued  long enough  to determine  the exact  year  in which  the infla- 
tion rates  of the two paths  converge,  but by 1980:4  the inflation  rate  along 
path B is only 0.3 percentage  point lower  than that along path A (at an 
annual  rate). 
The simulations  confirm  the conclusion  of last year's  article  that policy 
makers  cannot  "buy"  permanent  price  stability  and full  employment  (when CNN 
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defined  as a 3.8 percent  unemployment  rate) by engineering  a recession. 
The difference  in this year's  simulations  is that the longer  lags in the new 
wage and price  equations  lengthen  the period  before  the rates  of inflation 
along  alternative  paths  of recovery  converge  to the same  value.  Along  path 
B the economy  receives  a sort  of payoff  for suffering  in 1970-74  in the form 
of a lower  rate of inflation  between  1975  and 1980.  But the advantage  of 
lower  inflation  along  path B is achieved  only at the cost of $171  billion  in 
forgone  output  at today's  prices!  Because  the current  rate of inflation  is 
heavily  dominated  by past events  that have determined  expectations,  and 
because  the forecasts  begin  with  considerable  slack  in the economy,  mone- 
tary and fiscal  policy  makers  can push  the unemployment  rate  to the level 
they consider  optimal  in the long run without  risking  a renewed  accelera- 
tion of inflation.  When  the assumed  paths  of output  growth  are  combined 
with  the inflation  predictions,  the model  enables  us to calculate  that  an 11.1 
percent  growth  rate  of nominal  income  would  be necessary  between  1970:4 
and 1972:4  to achieve  path A, requiring  a 1971  gross  national  product  of 
$1,060 billion. Path B involves  more moderate  rates of nominal  income 
growth  in the five  years  to 1975:4  of, respectively,  7.9, 7.3, 9.1, 9.2, and  9.5 
percent. 
The negligible  permanent  impact  on the inflation  rate and huge output 
loss associated  with  the choice  of path  B instead  of path  A suggests  another 
comparison,  based  on this question:  What  benefits  have  been  derived  from 
the recession  of 1970,  as opposed  to an alternative  policy  that would  have 
maintained  continuous  full employment?  Path C assumes  continuous  and 
steady  growth  of output  at the 4.3 percent  growth  rate of potential  output 
beginning  in 1969:4, resulting  in a permanent  unemployment  rate of 3.8 
percent.  The predicted  rate of inflation  during  1971  would average  more 
than 1 percentage  point faster  along path C than along path A, but sub- 
sequently  the advantage  of path A would narrow  until by 1980:4 the in- 
flation  rate along path C would  be only 0.5 percentage  point faster  than 
that along A. This small benefit of path A is purchased  at the cost of 
approximately  $100  billion  in lost output  (in today's  prices)  as compared 
with path C. 
Conclusions 
The statistical  investigation  carried  out in this paper  suggests  answers  to 
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First, what are the fundamental  determinants  of inflation?  The rate of 
inflation  is increased  permanently  when labor market  tightness  increases 
to a new higher  level.  The regressions  confirm  the suggestion  made  in last 
year's  article  that  disguised  unemployment  and  the unemployment  of hours 
should be taken  into account  in measures  of labor market  tightness,  and 
they support  Perry's  recent demonstration  that the increased  dispersion 
of unemployment  in the 1960s  shifted  the inflation-unemployment  tradeoff 
in an unfavorable  direction.  The rate of inflation  at any given time also 
depends  crucially  on the expected  rate  of inflation  inherited  from  the past. 
Factors  that contribute  to temporary  increases  in the rate of inflation  are 
increases  in social  security  or personal  income  tax rates,  a sudden  accelera- 
tion of the demand  for commodities  (which  raises  the ratio of new orders 
to capacity),  and a sudden  deceleration  of output,  which  causes  a decline 
in the ratio of actual  to "standard"  productivity  because  of lags in hiring 
and firing.  A simulation  of the full wage-price  model indicates  that a 1 
percentage  point increase  in the social  security  tax rate  has an inflationary 
impact  that, at its maximum,  raises  the rate  of inflation  by 0.23 percentage 
point two quarters  after the tax increase,  but that dissipates  completely 
after  ten quarters.  An increase  of the effective  personal  income  tax rate  by 
1 percentage  point has a smaller  but long-lasting  influence  that reaches  a 
maximum  effect  of 0.16  percentage  point  after  three  quarters,  and  continues 
to have a small  effect  even after  four years,  due to the lagged  interaction 
of the wage and price  equations.  The statistical  research  is less conclusive 
on two issues:  The "accelerationist"  hypothesis  can  be statistically  rejected 
but  by a narrower  margin  than  in most previous  research;  and  the evidence 
does not give strong  support  to any aggregate  measure  of unemployment 
as an indicator  of labor  market  tightness,  including  Perry's  weighted  unem- 
ployment  rate. On both of these issues, experimentation  not reported  in 
this paper  indicates  that the data do not give strong  signals,  and there  is 
relatively  little difference  in the accuracy  with which several  alternative 
hypotheses  appear  to fit the historical  record. 
Second,  what  caused  the sustained  inflation  of 1968-70?  The fundamen- 
tal problem  in 1968-69  was excess  demand,  which  pushed  the unemploy- 
ment  rate  to a level  of 3.3 percent  in early  1969  and  tightened  labor  markets 
as measured  by unemployment  dispersion  and hidden unemployment. 
Some temporary  upward  price  pressure  also came from the direct  effects 
of the substantial  social security  tax increase  of 1966  and the personal  tax 
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put growth  between  mid-1968  and mid-1969,  which caused  a substantial 
drop  in the ratio of actual  to "standard"  productivity.  Easier  labor  market 
conditions  in 1970  had not substantially  moderated  the rate of inflation  at 
year's  end because  of long lags in the wage-price  process. 
Third,  has inflation  been worse in the early seventies  than could have 
been anticipated  knowing  the unemployment  rates  that characterized  the 
economy  in the late sixties?  A given  official  unemployment  rate  was associ- 
ated with more inflation  in the late 1960s  than it was in the mid-1950s 
because  of the increased  dispersion  of unemployment,  so that in the long 
run even a 4.0 percent  "full  employment"  rate of unemployment  causes  a 
5 percent  rate of inflation  now, as compared  with only a 3 percent  rate of 
inflation  in the mid-1950s. 
Finally, what is the optimal  policy for 1971-72?  At the outset, policy 
makers  will have the unpleasant  task of choosing  the particular  long-run 
combination  of inflation and unemployment  they wish to  achieve. To 
many, the inflation  rate of more than 5 percent  that this paper suggests 
may accompany  a "full employment"  unemployment  rate of 3.8 percent 
is unacceptable.  On the other  hand,  there  appears  to be good reason  to be- 
lieve that the main  costs of a  fully anticipated  inflation  are small,  and  that 
most of the political furor caused by the recent inflation  has been due 
to its unanticipated  character.  If a 3.8 percent  unemployment  rate is the 
long-run  goal of policy,  no long-run  benefit  will  be achieved  by a "stop-go" 
policy  that results  in recessions  like that of 1970.  Simulations  in this paper 
show that, even if full employment  is reattained  by very  rapid  output  ex- 
pansion  between  now and the end of 1972,  the recession  will have  caused 
a loss of $100 billion in output  (at today's  prices)  to achieve  an inflation 
rate that at best, in 1971-72,  is only 1 percentage  point less than the rate 
that would have obtained  if the unemployment  rate had been held at 3.8 
percent  from 1969:4 onwards.  Similarly,  a policy to hold the unemploy- 
ment rate at its present  level of about 6 percent  for another  two years  to 
"beat  the inflation  out of the system"  will cost an additional  $171  billion  in 
real output  to achieve  a further  reduction  in the inflation  rate  that reaches 
a maximum  of 1.5 percentage  points  but then disappears.  In short,  what- 
ever  the  target  for  the unemployment  rate  in the  long  run,  the  best  short-run 
stabilization  strategy  is to guide the economy  to it as rapidly  as possible 
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APPENDIX  A 
Estimation  of Equations  for Interest  Rates, 
Wages,  and Prices 
Interest  Rates 
Since  an increase  in the expected  rate  of inflation  (gpe)  raises  the nominal 
market  interest  rate (i) relative  to the real interest  rate  (r), historical  data 
on the market  interest  rate  contain  information  on the formation  of price 
expectations.  If the real  interest  rate  were  constant,  and  if the expected  rate 
of inflation  were based completely  on a weighted  average  of past actual 
rates of inflation  (ga), the magnitude  of the weight for each of the past 
periods  (we) could be estimated  from the following regression  equation: 
T 
(A.1)  it =  r +  E  wig,,,- +  ut, 
i=O 
where  u, is the error  term. 
In fact, equation  (A.1) provides  a very  poor explanation  of the market 
interest  rate in the postwar  United States because  the real interest  rate 
has not been constant.  While a sizable  econometric  model would be re- 
quired  to describe  completely  the determinants  of the real  rate,  an adequate 
approximation  can be developed  from a simple two-equation  textbook 
model of the economy.  In the commodity  market  of the model,  the log of 
per capita  real output  (Q) is a linear  function  of the log of "autonomous" 
components  of real per capita  spending  (A), the log of real per capita  in- 
come  (Q), the  real  interest  rate  (i -  gre), and  the log of real  money  balances 
per capita (m =  (M/p)). 
(A.2)  =  At +  aQQt  -  ar(it-  gp)  +  ammt. 
In the money market,  the log of real per capita  money  demand  (m)  is a 
linear  function  of real per capita output,  the nominal interest  rate (which 
represents  the opportunity  cost of holding  money),  and  past  real  per  capita 
balances: 
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Equations  (A.2) and (A.3) are, respectively,  particular  versions  of IS and 
LM curves  of traditional  macroeconomic  analysis,  and  they can be solved 
simultaneously  for the nominal  interest  rate: 
B(Ag  -  B2mt +  B3mt_1  +  B4gpe  (A.4)  it  B-5 
where 
Bi  =  bQ 
B2 =  1 -  aQ  -  ambQ 
B3=  bm(l -  aQ) 
B4 =  bQar 
B15  =  bQar  +  bi(I  -  aQ). 
In (A.4) the nominal  interest  rate  is a function  of autonomous  spending 
components,  the level of current  and past real money balances,  and the 
expected  rate of inflation.  Note that the coefficient  of g,e is not unity  un- 
less the demand  for money is interest  inelastic.  Equation  (A.4) can be 
converted  into an econometric  equation  to estimate  the B parameters  and 
the weights applied  to past rates of inflation  in the calculation  of the 
expected  rate of inflation.  The growth  rate in the consumption  deflator, 
gd,  is used to measure  inflation.  It is assumed  here that autonomous  ex- 
penditures  consist  of the real  per  capita  values  of government  spending  on 
goods and services  (G), exports  (E), and the "autonomous"  component 
of investment,  which  in turn  is assumed  to be determined  (as in an accelera- 
tor model)  by a distributed  lag on past rates of change  of real per capita 
private nonfarm output (gN).  Further, eleven past values of  real money 
balances  are allowed  to enter  the equation  to permit  a more flexible  lag 
distribution  than the single lagged value in (A.4). Equations  have been 
estimated  both for the Treasury  bill rate  (irB)  and three-  to five-year  gov- 
ernment  bond rate (i315) with the following  results,  where in each case 
equations  were estimated  with a transformation  to correct  for first-order 
serial  correlation: 
(A.5)  iTBt  =  0.695 +  0.016(G  +  E)t +  0.345gNL  -  0.030mL  +  1.16gdL. 
(0.4)  (0.9)  (2.8)  (-1.3)  (3.2) 
.2  =  0.954,  standard  error  = 0.00339, 
standard  error  without lagged residual  feedback =  0.00438, 
coefficient  of first-order  serial  correlation  = 0.494, 
Durbin-Watson  statistic =  1.633. 
The numbers  in parentheses  here and in subsequent  equations  are t-statistics. Robert J. Gordon  147 
(A.6)  i3/5t =  0.199 +  0.042(G +  E)t +  0.157gNz -  0.080mL  +  0.646gdZ 
(1.7)  (3.3)  (1.8)  (-4.9)  (2.5) 
A2  =  0.965, standard error =  0.00237, 
standard  error  without  lagged residual  feedback = 0.00277, 
coefficient  of first-order  serial  correlation  = 0.510, 
Durbin-Watson  statistic=  1.660. 
In both cases the sample  period  was 1954:1 to 1969:4. The subscript  L 
denotes  the sum of a series  of distributed  lag coefficients,  with individual 
coefficients  constrained  to lie along a fourth-degree  polynomial  with both 
a level and a first  derivative  equal  to zero in the most distant  period.  In- 
dividual  lagged  coefficients  and t-statistics  are shown in Table A-1. The 
sample  period  ends  in 1969,  rather  than  1970,  because  the  peculiar  behavior 
of interest  rates in 1970 is not explained  well by any of the interest  rate 
equations  with which I have worked;  the inclusion  of 1970 observations 
would  thus cause substantial  changes  in coefficients. 
Wages  and  Prices 
The individual  lagged  coefficients  and t-statistics  for the wage and price 
equations  are illustrated  in Table  A-2. The constraints  on the polynomial 
are identical  to those in the interest  rate equations. s:wQNc  NNNNNNNo  o 
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Table  A-2. Coefficients  of Lagged  Variables  in Wage  and  Price Equationsa 
Wage  equation  Price equation 
Change  Change  in  Change  in ratio  Change  in 
in social  product  of actual to  standard 
security  price  potential  unit labor 
tax rate  variable  productivity  cost 
Period  g(Il(1-Ta))  g9  -  gd  gqaq  gwq 
t  1.00  ...  -0.066  (-1.9)  0.216  (2.9) 
t -  1  -0.50  0.263 (3.0)  -0.037  (-1.6)  0.193 (5.9) 
t -  2  -0.33  0.128 (2.4)  -0.029  (-1.2)  0.167 (5.4) 
t -  3  -0.17  0.065 (1.3)  -0.030  (-1.3)  0.140 (3.6) 
t -  4  ...  0.042  (1.1)  -0.031  (-1.3)  0.113  (2.9) 
t -  5  ...  0.036  (0.9)  -0.027  (-1.2)  0.087  (2.5) 
t -  6  ...  0.032  (0.7)  -0.017  (-1.1)  0.064  (2.3) 
t -  7  ...  0.022  (0.7)  -0.006  (-1.1)  0.044  (1.9) 
t -  8  ...  0.008 (0.7)  ...  0.027 (1.2) 
t -  9  ...  ...  ...  0.014(0.6) 
Mean lag  ...  2.5  2.4  2.6 
Sum of coefficients  0.0  0.596  -0.243  1.062 
Source:  Same as Table A-1. 
a.  The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
APPENDIX  B 
Procedures  Used To Generate  Explanatory 
Variables  in Forecasts 
THE ESTIMATED  WAGE  AND PRICE  EQUATIONS,  together with the expecta- 
tion weights  derived  from the interest  rate equations,  are capable  of gen- 
erating  a predicted  path of wage and price change,  given values of four 
independent  variables:  unemployment  dispersion  (DU), the difference  be- 
tween the total and official  unemployment  rates (UL -  U), the ratio of 
actual  to potential  productivity  (q/q'), and the ratio of unfilled  orders  to 
capacity  (UF/K). In order  to project  the inflation  that would accompany 
alternative  paths of real output,  the expected  relationship  between  these 
variables  and future  output  is estimated  in this appendix. 
The underlying  assumptions  about  output  growth  are  contained  in equa- 
tions (B.1) and (B.2). Using these equations,  the gap (H) between  actual 
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total  real  gross  national  product  grows  at the same  rate  as real  private  non- 
farm  output  (Qt) and potential  real GNP grows  at a steady  annual  rate  of 
4.3 percent  throughout  the forecast  period. 
(B.1)  gxt  gQt 
(B.2)  Ht  (Xt' -  Xe). 
In the estimated  equations  presented  below,  the sample  period  is 1954:1 
to 1970:4, and the subscript  L denotes  the sum of a series  of distributed 
lag coefficients  estimated  by the technique  described  in Appendix  A. In- 
dividual  lag coefficients  and their t-statistics  are presented  in Table B-1. 
All rates  of change  refer  to one-quarter  changes  except  for equation  (B.l 1), 
in which the variables  are in the form of four-quarter  changes.  The first 
estimated  equation,  (B.3),  relates  the ratio  (J) of actual  to trend  labor  force 
participation  of secondary  workers  to the past history  of the unemploy- 
ment rate  (which  is assumed  to enter  as the inverse,  1/U). 
(B.3)  Jt =  0.912 +  0.0038  (1/U)L. 
(51.2)  (4.6) 
R2  =  0.896,  standard error =  0.00509, 
standard  error  without lagged residual  feedback = 0.00981, 
serial  correlation  coefficient  = 0.802, 
Durbin-Watson  statistic =  1.965. 
The demand  for private nonfarm  manhours  (L) is estimated  next in 
equation  (B.4). It is a function  of real nonfarm  private  output  (Q), with 
changes  in L assumed  to react  to changes  in Q with a lag. Because  of this 
lag in labor demand,  productivity  fluctuates  during  cycles of output  and 
tends  to be highest  (relative  to its long-run  trend)  during  periods  when  out- 
put growth  is most rapid.  Since  secondary  workers  produce  less output  per 
manhour  than primary  workers,  an increase  in J increases  the number  of 
manhours  required  to produce  any given  level of output  and enters  as an 
additional  variable  explaining  L. 
(B.4)  gL, =  -0.0027  +  0.658gQL  +  0.438gJ.L 
(-1.7)  (4.7)  (1.3) 
2=  0.808, standard  error =  0.00415, 
Durbin-Watson  statistic =  2.033. 
The rate of growth  of private  nonfarm  productivity  is calculated  from 
the identity  (B.5): 
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In (B.6),  the  potential  rate  of growth  of manhours  (gL')  is calculated  from 
the manhours  equation  (B.4)  for a steady  rate  of growth  of output  of 1.075 
percent  per quarter;  gL, equals  0.44 percent  per quarter,  or 1.75 percent 
per year. 
(B.6)  =L't --0.0027  +  0.658 (0.01075)  =  0.0044. 
The total unemployment  rate of manhours  (UL)  is calculated  using (B.7), 
which adjusts  the observed  total unemployment  rate at the beginning  of 
the forecast  period  by each period's  difference  between  the actual  rate of 
growth  of manhours  (gL)  and 0.0044,  their  potential  rate of growth. 
(B.7)  (1 -  UtL) =  (1 -  Ut 1) +  (g9L -  0.0044)  (1 -  UL). 
The level  of potential  productivity  (q')  is computed  sequentially  for each 
quarter  in (B.8), using the quarterly  growth rates of potential output 
(0.01075)  and  potential  manhours  (0.0044)  from  (B.6) and a starting-point 
estimate  of potential  productivity: 
(B.8)  qf =  q1_1  (1 +  0.01075 -  0.0044). 
The level of actual  productivity  calculated  in (B.5) is divided  by the level 
of potential  productivity  to create the productivity  ratio variable  (q/q') 
needed  for the price  equation  and for predicting  the unemployment  rate. 
The official  unemployment  rate  (U) is estimated  in (B.9) as a function  of 
productivity  ratio  (q/q') and the output  gap (H). 
(B.9)  ut =  -0.0606  +  0.100 (q/q'),  +  0.453HL. 
(-1.3)  (2.0)  (8.6) 
P2  =  0.952,  standard error =  0.00237, 
standard  error  without  lagged residual  feedback = 0.00400, 
serial  correlation  coefficient  = 0.783, Durbin-Watson  statistic =  1.61. 
In (B.10) unemployment  dispersion  (DU) is related  to the official  un- 
employment  rate,  using a simple  equation  that generates  predictions  con- 
sistent  with demographic  forecasts  compiled  by George  Perry. 
(B.10)  DU  =  0.4511 +  3.65 (0.060 -  U). 
The final equation,  (B.11), explains  changes  in the ratio of detrended 
unfilled  orders  to capacity  as a function  of the past behavior  of the GNP 
gap. As would be expected,  the coefficients  (see Table B-1) indicate  that 
a reduction  in the gap  first  raises  and  then  reduces  UF/K, although  the net 
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zero. Unlike the other equations,  here the dependent  variable  is in the 
form of a four-quarter  change. 
(B.l1)  g(UFIK)t=  0.023 +  0.559HL. 
(0.4)  (0.4) 
R2 =  0.838,  standard error =  0.0546, 
standard  error  without  lagged residual  feedback = 0.100, 
serial correlation  coefficient  = 0.822, Durbin-Watson  statistic =  1.30. 
APPENDIX  C 
Symbols  and Sources  of Data 
Used in Regressions 
THIS APPENDIX  PROVIDES  the definition and method of  constructing 
certain special variables  used in the regressions;  a complete  list of the 
symbols  used,  together  with their  sources;  and a key to the abbreviations 
used to identify  the sources. 
Newly  Devised  Variables 
The wage  rate (w). The series, "straight-time  private  nonfarm  average 
hourly  earnings  adjusted  for changes  in industry  mix"  is constructed  as a 
weighted  average  of average  hourly earnings  for the individual  industry 
classifications  shown below, with 1963 employment  by industry  used as 
weights. (The constant employment  weights are derived  from Monthly 
Labor  Review,  Volume  94 (March  1971),  Table  11,  page  95.)  Only  the  manu- 
facturing  data are adjusted  to remove  the effects  of overtime.  In order  to 
adjust  for fringe  benefits,  the aggregated  data for each quarter  are multi- 
plied by the ratio of total compensation  of employees  to wage and salary 
income as recorded  in the national  income accounts.  The individual  in- 
dustries  and sources  of data are as follows:' 
1. See  "Key to Sources,"  pp. 157-58. 154  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1971 
Industry  Source 
Manufacturing  (excludes  the effect  of overtime  BLS 1616/EL 
and  is based  on fixed  industry  weights  at the 
three-digit  level  for 1959-70,  and at the two- 
digit  level before 1959) 
Mining  EE/MLR 
Contract  construction  EE/MLR 
Transportation  and  public  utilities  (unweighted  EE/MLR 
average  of Class I railroads  and telephone 
communication) 
Wholesale  trade  EE/MLR 
Retail  trade  EE/MLR 
Finance,  insurance,  real estate  EE/MLR (annual  data 
interpolated  before 
1964) 
Services  Assumed equal to  re- 
tail trade 
The  nonfarm  private  deflator  calculated  with  fixed weights  (p). The non- 
farm  private  deflator  used in the regressions  is a fixed-weight  average  of 
fifteen  separate  expenditure  deflators,  weighted  by 1963  expenditures.  All 
data  are  from  SCB.  Sectors  with  positive  weights  are  durable  consumption, 
nondurable  consumption,  consumption  of services,  residential  structures, 
nonresidential  structures,  producers'  durable  equipment,  exports,  federal 
spending  on goods and services,  and state and local spending  on goods 
and services.  Sectors  with negative  weights  are imports,  general  govern- 
ment  product,  farm  product,  rest-of-world  product,  and  household  product. 
Unemployment  rate  of hours  (UH).  Quarterly  data  on actual  private  non- 
farm  hours  worked  after  1964  were  obtained  from  EE and SCB.  Since  only 
annual  private  nonfarm  data are available  before 1964  from this source, 
quarterly  nonfarm  private  hours  were  interpolated  from  annual  data  using 
the pattern  of manufacturing  hours.  "Potential"  private  nonfarm  average 
hours  per  man were  estimated  by a trend  line moving  between  peak quar- 
ters in average  hours in 1950:4, 1955:4, and 1966:1. After 1966:1 a 
further  adjustment  was made: Since average  hours were much lower in 
1967-69  than a projection  of the 1955-66  trend  line would  have  predicted, 
a new  trend  line  was  drawn  between  actual  average  hours  worked  in 1966:  1 
and 1968:3.  After 1968:3  the potential  trend  line was continued  using  the Robert  J. Gordon  155 
rate of decline  in average  hours  per worker  between  1955  and 1966.  The 
unemployment  rate of hours  is then 1.0 minus  the ratio of actual  to "po- 
tential"  private  nonfarm  hours. 
Disguised unemployment  (UD).  Disguised unemployment is equal to the 
"labor  reserve"  divided  by the civilian  labor  force,  where  the labor  reserve 
is defined  as the potential  total labor  force  (including  armed  forces)  minus 
the actual  total labor force. The potential  total labor force is computed 
separately  for "primary"  workers  (males aged 25-54) and "secondary" 
workers.  For each group,  it is defined  as the population  times  its potential 
labor force participation  rate. The actual  total labor force participation 
rate  is explained  in regressions  using  (1) a constant  and a time  trend  in the 
case of primary  workers,  and (2) a constant,  a time trend, and the ratio 
of secondary  total employment  to secondary  population  in the case of 
secondary  workers.  The potential  labor force participation  rate for each 
group  is derived  by substituting  into the fitted  regressions  an assumed  "full 
employment"  secondary  employment  rate of 95.0 percent. 
The ratio of unfilled orders to capacity (UF/K).  The ratio of unfilled 
orders  to shipments  in durable  manufacturing  (from BS and SCB) was 
multiplied  by the Federal  Reserve  Board  index of capacity  utilization  in 
manufacturing  (from  BCD).  The resulting  ratio  was detrended  by dividing 
it by values  along a trend  line extended  between  peaks  in 1952:3, 1956:3, 
and 1966:4. 
Potential  private  nonfarm  productivity  (q'). A trend line was extended 
between  values  of actual  productivity  in 1950:4, 1955:2, and 1966:1. 
Symbols  and  Sources 
Symbol  Name  of Variable  Source 
CMH  Compensation  per manhour;  PWP 
overtime  and industry  mix adjustment  RJG, 1969 
c  Consumer  price  index  BS/SCB 
Ca  Expected  price  variable  RJG, 1970 
d  Personal  consumption  deflator  SCB 
de  Expected  rate of inflation  in d, weights 
used  for  calculations  listed  in Table  A-1 
DG  Guidepost  dummy;  equals  0.25  in 
1962:1,  0.50  in  1962:2,  0.75  in 156  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1971 
Symbol  Name  of Variable  Source 
1962:3, 1.0 in 1962:4 to 1966:4, 0.75 
in  1967:1, 0.50  in  1967:2, 0.25  in 
1967:3, and 0.0 in other  periods 
DU  Unemployment  dispersion  index  GLP 
E  Real exports  per capita  SCB,  BS/ERP 
g  Percentage  rate of growth 
G  Real government  spending per capita,  SCB,  BS/ERP 
both federal  and state and local 
H  Potential  minus  actual  GNP  BCD 
i315  Rate on three- to five-year  government  BS/SCB 
bonds 
iTB  Rate on Treasury  bills  BS/SCB 
J  Ratio of actual to potential  labor force  App. C 
participation  of secondary  workers 
L  Private  nonfarm  manhours  PWP 
m  Monetary  base per capita  divided  by the  SL, BS/ERP 
GNP deflator 
N  Nonfarm  private  output  per capita  SCB,  BS/ERP 
p  Nonfarm  private  deflator,  calculated  with  App. C 
fixed  weights 
pe  Expected  price  variable,  explained  in con- 
text 
q  Nonfarm  private  output  per manhour; 
equals Q/L 
q'  Potential  value  of q  App. C 
Q  Nonfarm  private  output  SCB 
Te  TI plus federal  plus state and local per-  SCB 
sonal  tax and nontax  payments  divided 
by personal  income 
TS  One-half  of federal  plus  state  and  local so-  SCB 
cial  security  tax  revenue  divided  by total 
wage and salary  payments 
U  Official  unemployment  rate  BS/SCB 
U*  Weighted  unemployment  rate  GLP 
UD  Disguised  unemployment  rate  App. C 
UH  Unemployment  rate of hours  App. C Robert  J. Gordon  157 
Symbol  Name of Variable  Source 
UL  Total unemployment  rate of manhours; 
equals U +  U" +  UD 
V  11.0 times nonagricultural  job openings  BCD 
divided  by civilian  labor  force 
w  New fixed-weight  wage index for private  App. C 
nonfarm  economy 
X  Real gross  national  product  SCB 
Key to Sources 
App. C  Earlier  pages  in this appendix 
BCD  Business Conditions  Digest, various issues 
BLS 1616/EI  Bureau  of Labor Statistics  Bulletin  1616, Summary  oj 
Manufacturing Production Workers Earning Series, 
1939-68, updated  with current  data from Economic 
Indicators 
BS/SCB  U.S. Office  of Business  Economics,  Business  Statistics, 
1969, for data to 1968:4, and various  issues of the 
Survey of Current  Business for subsequent data 
BS/ERP  Same  as BS/SCB, but with subsequent  data from Eco- 
nomic Report of the President, various issues 
EE/MLR  Bureau  of Labor  Statistics  Bulletin  1312-6,  Employment 
and Earnings  Statistics  for the United States, 1909-68, 
updated with  current data from Monthly Labor 
Review 
GLP  Data provided  by George  L. Perry,  as used  in his paper, 
"Changing  Labor  Markets  and Inflation,"  Brookings 
Papers on Economic Activity (3:1970),  pp.  411-41 
PWP  Bureau  of Labor  Statistics  quarterly  mimeographed  re- 
lease, "Productivity,  Wages,  and Prices" 
RJG, 1969  Robert  J. Gordon,  "Problems  in Predicting  the Rate of 
Inflation,"  paper presented  to the Econometric  So- 
ciety meetings,  New York, December  30, 1969 
RJG, 1970  Robert  J. Gordon, "The Recent  Acceleration  of Infla- 
tion and  Its Lessons  for  the  Future,"  Brookings  Papers 
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SL  Mimeographed  releases  from  the Federal  Reserve  Bank 
of St. Louis 
SCB  1966 Supplement  to the Survey of Current  Business (The 
National Income and Product Accounts of the United 
States, 1929-65: Statistical Tables) for data to 1963:4, 
and various issues of the Survey of Current  Business 
for subsequent  data Comments  and 
Discussion 
William  Brainard:  Gordon  has presented  a provocative  paper  and intro- 
duced  two interesting  innovations:  his new  wage  variable  and  his measure 
of price  expectations.  The  use of a fixed-weight  wage  index,  which  Gordon 
has  constructed,  seems  desirable  on both  theoretical  and  empirical  grounds. 
Basically,  we believe  that the excess  demand  variables  affect  wages  differ- 
ently  from  changes  in the industry  mix  of employment,  so a variable  purged 
of mix changes  is useful  for the assessment  of the effect  of excess  demand. 
Furthermore,  it seems  reasonable  to suppose  that a change  in total com- 
pensation  due  to changes  in the industry  mix  has a different  effect  on prices 
from a change  in compensation  arising  from  the wage rate.  In particular, 
it is not clear  why a change  in the industry  mix by itself should  lead to 
greater  pessimism  about  the  rate  of inflation,  given  the course  of wage  rates. 
In Gordon's  price equation,  however,  for a lag extending  four quarters 
back,  compensation  appears  to be roughly  as important  as changes  in the 
adjusted  wage rate. If mix effects are in fact largely  responsible  for the 
movement  in the ratio of compensation  per manhour  to the wage  rate,  its 
coefficient  in this equation is likely to reflect  the relatively  procyclical 
behavior  of high-wage  industries,  and its significance  should  not be taken 
to indicate  a causal  relationship  between  increases  in average  compensation 
and the rate of inflation. 
Gordon  stresses  the use of a new  price  expectations  variable.  This  varia- 
ble is constructed  by using  weights  on past price  changes  coming  from a 
regression  that relates  nominal  rates of interest  to autonomous  spending 
components,  the level of current  and past real money  balances,  and past 
rates of inflation.  This is an interesting  way to proceed  and may well re- 
move  some  of the simultaneous  equation  bias  usually  thought  to be present 
when wages  are regressed  on prices.  The fact that the coefficient  on price 
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expectations  on the interest  rate equation  is approximately  1.2 suggests, 
however,  that some of the problem  remains,  since according  to the theo- 
retical  model Gordon uses in its specification,  it should be less than 1. 
When  the constructed  price  expectations  series  is used  in the wage  equation 
instead  of the CPI, its coefficient  is larger,  but no more  significant.  When 
lagged  values of the growth  rate in the nonfarm  private  deflator  are in- 
cluded in the regression,  however,  the quantitative  importance  of the 
sophisticated  price  expectations  variable  virtually  disappears:  Lag values 
of the deflator,  which are supposed  to measure  what Gordon calls the 
"product  price effect,"  get virtually  all the weight. Taken at face value, 
these  results  indicate  that it is producers'  rather  than consumers'  expecta- 
tions that matter. 
Gordon  utilizes  his preferred  wage  and  price  equations  to derive  a long- 
run  relationship  between  unemployment  and  inflation.  He assumes-prop- 
erly,  in my view-that the ratio  of unfilled  orders  to capacity,  and  of actual 
to standard  productivity,  is independent  of the unemployment  rate  in the 
long run.  Presumably,  most of the correlation  between  these  variables  and 
unemployment  during  the sample  period  reflects  mutual  correlation  with 
the cycle, rather  than some long-run  causal  connection.  For similar  rea- 
sons, I believe  that the long-run  impact  of unemployment  on the rate of 
inflation that works through the remaining  variables  in his equation 
(D U, UD,  UH,  and price expectations)  is likely to be overstated.  First, 
Gordon  estimates  a 3.65  point  increase  in dispersion  for a 1 point  reduction 
in unemployment;  but a good case can be made for thinking  that in the 
long run  the level  of dispersion  would  be independent  of the level  of unem- 
ployment.  As its significant  coefficient  in Gordon's  wage  equation  indicates, 
recent  changes  in dispersion  may well have shifted  the Phillips  curve,  but 
it requires  an additional  belief  in the long-run  connection  between  disper- 
sion and  unemployment  to infer  that the curve  is steeper  than  it otherwise 
would  be. Second,  as Gordon  recognizes,  the large  coefficients  on his labor 
market  demand  variables  are  likely  to reflect  the fact that they are  proxies 
for some other  cyclical  variables.  If so, even  if they respond  to unemploy- 
ment  in the long run as much  as Gordon  estimates,  the long-run  effect  on 
wages  and prices  of such a response  is probably  overestimated.  Third,  all 
of the price  variables  Gordon  tries  for price  expectations  are  subject  to the 
usual  complaint  that prices  and wages  may be jointly influenced  by some 
other  cyclical  variables  and that the price  coefficient  in the wage  equation 
or the wage coefficient  in the price equation  is likely to embody simul- Robert  J. Gordon  161 
taneous  equation  bias. Perhaps  it should also be noted that forming  the 
price  expectations  variable  using  the consumer  price  index  rather  than  the 
personal  consumption  deflator  would have resulted  in a much smaller 
estimated  difference  between  the slopes  of the short-  and  long-run  Phillips 
curves. 
Gordon  pays unusual  attention  to the effect of direct  taxes on pretax 
wage  rates.  Although  his regressions  provide  useful  information  about  the 
short-run  impact  of tax changes  on wages,  they provide  a very  weak  basis 
for deciding  whether  labor or capital  bears  the tax burden.  An increase  in 
an employment  or income  tax is effectively  an upward  shift in the pretax 
labor  supply  schedule,  which  in the usual  textbook  treatment  would  result 
in a lower level of "equilibrium"  employment  and a higher  equilibrium 
level  of the pretax  real  wage  rate  (assuming  that  supply  and  demand  are  not 
perfectly  inelastic).  In the context  of the Phillips  curve,  such a shift  would 
mean  that  in the long run  a lower  level  of unemployment,  and  a higher  rate 
of change  in wages,  would  be associated  with a given  level of employment; 
or alternatively,  that  given  rates  of unemployment  and  wage  increase  would 
be associated  with  a lower  level  of employment.  These  effects  are  permanent 
and remain  as long as there  is a real tax wedge  between  what employers 
pay and  what  employees  get.  Now Gordon  uses a rather  peculiar  definition 
of burden  in his discussion.  It is true  that  if labor  cares  only  about  its share, 
and not how much  it gets,  then under  his assumptions,  the "burden"  of a 
tax increase  is borne  entirely  by labor  in the long run.  But  his results  tell us 
nothing  about who bears  the burden  of a reduction  in employment  and 
output that would be associated  with given rates of unemployment  and 
wage  increase,  in either  the short or the long run. 
Thomas  Juster: First,  let me commend  Gordon  for the attempts  he makes 
here to adjust  the basic data in order  to get numbers  that accord  more 
closely  to the analytic  concepts  in his model.  The  profession  does too little 
of this.  The  focus  of this model  is the role of price  expectations  in wage  de- 
termination  and subsequent  inflation.  Does the model in fact capture  the 
role of expected  prices?  I am one of the critics  noted  in the paper  who ob- 
jects  to the use of distributed  lags  on past  changes  to measure  price  expecta- 
tions on the simple  grounds  that  the process  is more  complicated  than  that. 
To rely  on distributed  lags  is to say  that  people  are  incapable  of making  use 
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havior  of a particular  statistical  series.  The  Livingston  series  is the only  one 
presented  that is not generated  by the lag process.  Like Gordon,  I would 
eliminate  the Livingston  data from  the list of legitimate  estimates  of price 
expectations,  but for reasons  different  from  his. The Livingston  data  are a 
collection  of economists'  judgments  about  what  will happen  to prices-not 
the price  expectations  of people  who bargain  for  wages  or make  labor  force 
decisions.  Some  data  collected  by the Survey  Research  Center  come  closer 
to measuring  the right  price  expectations,  although  they probably  do not 
cover  the period  Gordon  deals  with. I expect  this series  would not fit the 
data  as well as the series  being  used.  But  I would  still  prefer  it because  it fits 
the analytic  concept  one is trying  to measure. 
Another  aspect  of the price  expectations  measure  that  I do not care  for is 
its implicit  assumption  that the lag structure  is constant.  I would expect 
that a greater  perception  of inflation  would  affect  the reaction  to it. And I 
would  also guess  that  when  inflation  is 2 percent  a year  no one cares  much, 
but when  it is 5 and 6 percent  a year,  people  notice  it; and this difference 
affects  the way  inflation  influences  their  wage  demands.  I would  also expect 
different  reactions  when  inflation  was  speeding  up than  when  it was  slowing 
down. One could  try to test for differences  in the lag structure  at different 
periods;  but  I doubt  that  there  are  enough  degrees  of freedom  in the data  to 
permit  this. Several  different  tests  were  run  on the size of the coefficient  for 
price  expectations,  all fitted  to the whole  period.  But looking  at the size of 
the standard  errors,  I find it difficult  to differentiate  among  them. I raise 
these questions  about the uncertainty  surrounding  Gordon's  estimate  of 
price  effects  because  his results  rest  so heavily  on the size of the coefficient 
of the price  expectation  term  and  the lag structure  that is built  into it. 
My final  observation  is that  I do not think  that  the erratic  behavior  of the 
series  on compensation  per  manhour  is as much  a result  of the overlapping 
years  and  year-end  adjustments  as Gordon  does.  There  is a lot of what  ap- 
pears  to be regular  cyclical  movement  in the series,  but I do not know  what 
causes  it. 
R. J. Gordon:  Regarding  the  interpretation  of the  0.6 coefficient  on the  ratio 
of total compensation  per  manhour  to my wage  index,  a 1 percent  increase 
in the ratio  increases  prices  by less than 1 percent  because  some  changes  in 
the ratio  reflect  shifts  in industry  mix or measurement  error,  which  do not 
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percent  increase  in the ratio reflects,  I believe,  the influence  on price of 
overtime,  executive  compensation,  and other  payments  that are included 
in the numerator  of the ratio but not in the denominator.  I agree  with 
Juster  that price  expectations  may adjust  to experience  with variable  lags, 
but I feel that the data  are  inadequate  to isolate  this effect.  I disagree  with 
Brainard's  interpretation  of the product  price  variable.  The different  lags 
on the two price variables  had been freely  estimated,  and they suggested 
quite separate  responses,  with an impact  of the product  price differential 
having  a mean  lag of 2.5 quarters  and  a quite  separate  impact  of consumer 
prices  on expectations  having  a mean  lag of 4.4 quarters. 
General Discussion 
Much  of the discussion  focused  on Gordon's  price  expectations  variable. 
Questions  arose both about the way expectations  had been estimated  by 
Gordon  and  about  the role  expectations  should  be expected  to play  in wage 
determination.  Franco Modigliani was skeptical about the long lags 
Gordon  associated  with  the price  expectations  variable.  He found  no ana- 
lytical  reason  to believe  that people  contracting  currently  for wages  would 
be worrying  about  prices  in the distant  future.  In his view,  reasonably  cur- 
rent  rather  than distant  price  changes  might  influence  wages.  He reported 
that in his own empirical  research,  which distinguished  between  a more 
highly  unionized  and a less unionized  sector  of the labor  market,  measures 
of price  expectations  based  on a long distributed  lag of past price  changes 
turned  out to be consistently  insignificant  or to have the wrong sign, or 
both. 
James  Duesenberry  and others argued  that expectations  about future 
price  increases  were  not well represented  by long moving  averages  of past 
price changes;  it seemed  unreasonable  to believe  that people form their 
views about the future simply and mechanically  by looking backward. 
Charles  Schultze  wondered  specifically  how  much  Gordon's  results  were  in- 
fluenced  by the sample  period  of the equations.  He conjectured  that, if the 
equations  had been fitted back through  the Korean  war, the lags on the 
price expectations  variables  would be shortened.  Like Juster, Schultze 
pointed  to the  possibility  of a variable  lag.  He felt  that  the duration  and  per- 
sistence  of inflation  in recent  years  has had a dominant  influence  on price 
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Arthur  Okun and George Perry agreed  with Brainard  that Gordon's 
results  showed  that producers'  rather  than consumers'  price expectations 
affected  wages.  They pointed out that this had different  implications  for 
some  types  of policy.  Excise  taxes,  for example,  would  have  no subsequent 
effect on wages on this view, whereas  they would have an impact  if the 
price  effect  operated  on labor  supply.  Duesenberry  noted  the various  ways 
that product  prices  could  operate  on wages;  he felt that  both  types  of price 
effects  were  relevant  and  wanted  the two separated  carefully. 
Paul  Samuelson  stressed  that  the true  position  and  shape  of the long-run 
Phillips  curve depended  on the size of a great many partial  derivatives, 
which  could  not be determined  with  any  precision.  The  resulting  estimate  of 
the curve  is subject  to enormous  uncertainty.  He was concerned  that re- 
search  on the tradeoff  in the Brookings  panel  may  have  been  excessively  in- 
fluenced  by the stubborn  behavior  of prices  and  wages  in 1970.  Since  prices 
and wages  rose faster  in 1970  than expected,  Gordon  got better  results  in 
explaining  the year by relying  on longer  lags and consequently  on larger 
price  expectation  coefficients.  In response,  Gordon  pointed  out that  the im- 
provements  in this year's  paper  were  equally  valid  in explaining  the period 
ending  in 1968;  and  equations  fitted  to the period  ending  in 1968  gave  good 
forecasts  of 1969-70,  as illustrated  in Figure  3. 
Samuelson  felt  that  intuition  and  insight  gave  different  economists  differ- 
ent answers;  his own intuition  stressed  changes  in society's  determination 
to alleviate  the human  misery  of unemployment.  He wondered  whether  the 
impact  of unemployment  on wage  determination  had  not shifted  over  time. 
As our society  has become  more  humane  in liberalizing  our systems  of un- 
employment  compensation  and welfare,  the Phillips  curve  may inevitably 
have  shifted  from  where  it would  have  been  ifjoblessness  were  an even  more 
desperate  problem  for individuals. 
Perry  was  concerned  about  the refinements  that  Gordon  had  made  in the 
labor  market  variables.  On theoretical  grounds,  he found the concepts  of 
disguised  unemployment  and of the unemployment  of hours  unconvincing 
as major  determinants  of labor  market  tightness,  although  they  might  have 
a place  as refinements  to a broad  unemployment  measure.  He also felt that 
the particular  way these variables  were  formed  was open to question  and 
may have given  a spurious  fit to recent  inflation.  Specifically,  he was skep- 
tical of the two-year  disruption  Gordon  imposed  in his construction  of an 
hours  trend  and  the negative  values  that  Gordon  attributed  to disguised  un- 
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in 1970.  Granting  that these  variables  have been serving  as proxies  for as- 
pects of labor market  tightness  other than those they were designed  to 
measure,  the fact that they took over the whole explanation  rather  than 
supplementing  an aggregate  unemployment  variable  made  it very  hard  to 
interpret  the results  in terms  of an unemployment-inflation  tradeoff.  The 
tradeoff  interpretation  had to rest on the casual  relations  between  these 
proxy variables  and the unemployment  rate presented  in Gordon's ap- 
pendix,  with little evidence  on what that relation  should be since it was 
unclear  what  the variables  were  proxies  for. 
Gordon  reemphasized  that  the unemployment  of hours  and  disguised  un- 
employment  variables  were  standing  as proxies  for unmeasurable  changes 
in excess  labor  demand.  It was  not surprising  that  the aggregate  unemploy- 
ment  rate  was an inaccurate  measure  of excess  demand  in a year  like 1969 
when  a large  part  of the increase  in employment  was made  possible  by an 
increase  in the labor  force  participation  rate.  The two-year  interruption  of 
the trend  in hours  per man was imposed  because  of a mysterious  drop  in 
1966-68 of almost one hour per week, far more than the postwar  down- 
trend  in hours  would imply.  This drop  was treated  by ad hoc procedures 
pending  detailed  microeconomic  research  to explore  its cause. 
Several  participants  expressed  interest  in Gordon's  explorations  with  tax 
variables.  Joseph Pechman  pointed out that the personal  tax measure 
Gordon  used,  the ratio  of taxes  to income,  rose over  time as a result  of pro- 
gressivity  when  incomes  increased  even  when  the tax laws  were  unchanged; 
he found  it implausible  that  this could  have  an impact  on before-tax  wages. 
Arthur  Okun  was  puzzled  by the way  the  two parts  of the social  security  tax 
operated.  According  to Gordon's  estimates,  employers  were  initially  stuck 
with  their  share  of the tax,  but  they  managed  to get  it unstuck  over  time  and 
shift it all back  to the employees.  Meanwhile,  however,  the workers  man- 
aged  to shift a small  portion  of their  share  onto employers.  It didn't  seem 
plausible  that  nominal  compensation  ultimately  reflected  a small  part  of the 
employees'  share  but none of the employers'  share. 
Gordon agreed  with both these comments.  In future  research  a more 
satisfactory  personal  tax rate series  should  be devised  and  if the coefficient 
on the employers'  tax had  to be constrained,  it would  make  more sense  to 
constrain  the total effect  to be identical  to that of the employee  tax. 
Both  Modigliani  and  Duesenberry  thought  that  future  research  on wages 
should separate  the unionized and nonunion sectors of the economy. 
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model  that separated  union and nonunion  wages.  In the union sector,  the 
number  of contract  negotiations  was an important  variable.  This  was  prob- 
ably one reason  that the two-sector  model did so well in explaining  1970, 
which saw an abnormally  large  number  of negotiations.  In the nonunion 
sector,  rises  in the minimum  wage  had  an  important  impact  on wages,  while 
social security  taxes had less of an influence  than in the union sector. 
Duesenberry  thought  that  the wage  settlements  in 1970  and 1971  were  being 
influenced  to a significant  degree  by previous  settlements,  even  though  the 
underlying  economic  conditions  had changed,  and  that this created  an un- 
usually  long lag in the slowing  of average  wage  changes  during  the current 
period  of high unemployment.  He thought  it hopeful  for the outlook  that 
the current  cycle of wage settlements  essentially  would be concluded  in 
1971. 